We're launching urlscan Labs to bring new and experimental features to our most advanced customers earlier. As part of the launch, we're making three new tools available:
* File uploads for malicious SMS / short messages.
* Multisearch
* Auto-Screenshots
urlscan.io/blog/2026/10/08/u…
Check in early for CYBERWARCON, skip the Friday line, & enjoy the open bar.
Plus, urlscan CEO Johannes Gilger on investigating phishing and brand impersonation with urlscan.io and urlscan Pro.
Early check-in: Thurs, Nov 19 | 6–8 PM ET | Hyatt Regency Crystal City
urlscan is excited to be a sponsor of @CYBERWARCON for the fourth year in a row. We will be co-hosting the early check-in event the evening before the conference. We would love for you to come by and say hello! - urlscan.io/blog/2026/11/11/c…
I can barely believe it myself, but urlscan.io is 10 years old today. Time to reminisce and look back at the things we have built over the past decade, how our platform and company have grown and where we're headed next: urlscan.io/blog/2026/11/09/u…
Local LLM models are getting good at handling the low hanging fruit of infrastructure pivots.
This was one shotted by a ~20GB Qwen3.6 on a macbook, connected up to @urlscanio over an MCP and given some basic analysis skills.
🇵🇭 68 GB stolen from a Philippine government agency, exposed by the thief’s own open directory
An operator copied 68 GB out of a government agency, logged every byte, then left that log open on the internet. We captured the directory while it was still serving.
The log is an rclone transfer record: 68.837 GiB across 27 SQL Server backups, finished in under 24 minutes on 6 September 2026.
What else sat in the open directory:
- A GodPotato privilege-escalation tool rebuilt and renamed "Wrqsnx," with the pipe, namespace and metadata changed and internal identifiers left intact
- A PowerShell stager that rebuilds the payload in memory from base64 fragments, so no DLL touches disk
- Two builds from two compilers, plus the full source tree
- A complete Impacket environment with LDAP/MSSQL relay checks and a Windows Server 2025 DC filter
What we did not find: the initial access vector, a C2 channel, or any confirmed payload execution. The log establishes a completed transfer and the staging of the tooling, nothing past it.
Full report + IOCs here 👇
hunt.io/blog/philippine-gove…
🚨 #PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618, CVE-2026-109619): everyone is staging the leaked PHP RCE, no one has landed it 🫠
We mapped the exposed PHP footprint and went into the attacker open directories after the Oct 21 leak.
What we found:
→ 683,922 IPs leaking a PHP version in one day of scans, mostly end-of-life builds
→ ~a dozen open-dir workspaces staging php2shell tooling, zero victims or shells in any of them
→ one mass operator sprayed up to 123 servers via a ~97-proxy farm, zero shells
→ scanning started ~20 min after the patch, driven by an existing Mirai-style botnet
→ no public PoC lands code exec on x86-64 yet (OOM corruption vs ASLR)
Patch now: 8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35.
Full research + network observables: hunt.io/blog/php2shell-cve-2…
🤖𝗡𝗲𝘄 𝗥𝗲𝘀𝗲𝗮𝗿𝗰𝗵: 𝗜𝗻𝘀𝗶𝗱𝗲 𝗮 𝗣𝗮𝗽𝗲𝗿𝗖𝘂𝘁 𝗔𝘁𝘁𝗮𝗰𝗸𝗲𝗿’𝘀 𝗔𝗜 𝗧𝗼𝗼𝗹𝗸𝗶𝘁: 𝗔𝗴𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝗜𝗻𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻𝘀, 𝗘𝘅𝗽𝗹𝗼𝗶𝘁 𝗖𝗼𝗱𝗲, 𝗮 𝗦𝗲𝗰𝗼𝗻𝗱 𝗥𝗖𝗘, 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗩𝗶𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗺𝘀 𝗔𝗰𝗿𝗼𝘀𝘀 𝟰𝟱+ 𝗖𝗼𝘂𝗻𝘁𝗿𝗶𝗲𝘀
After GreyNoise and Blackpoint Cyber published on the PaperCut campaign, our team used AttackCapture to dig into the infrastructure and recovered new intelligence from the operator’s own files.
Three open directories on the attacker’s server were still in use when we pulled them
What we found:
➜ A second RCE path through PaperCut’s XML-RPC API, independent of the Tapestry vulnerability chain
➜ The full AI agent instructions (19KB, Russian and English) directing a DeepSeek model through OpenAI Codex with up to 25 concurrent subagents
➜ Custom Rust credential collectors targeting Windows LSA secrets, plus chisel/cron persistence for reverse SOCKS5 tunnels
➜ Packaged victim kits covering 46 Active Directory domains, ready for reuse
➜ 1,005 hosts in the recon pool across 45+ countries, with 45 targets confirmed to have live internal pivots at time of capture
This wasn’t a smash-and-grab... The operator’s own journal entries show an iterative process: batching targets, retrying failures, debugging tooling, and reorganizing victim lists with minimal human intervention.
Our research reconstructs the full pipeline from the attacker’s own files 👇
hunt.io/blog/inside-papercut…
Thread 🧵
1/ NEW REPORT: Billions of advertising auctions determine in real time which ads we see on websites and in apps every day. Our latest research shows how the same data fueling this advertising ecosystem is being used to profile millions of users and silently infect targets with zero-click mercenary spyware, a novel attack technique we call "Adfection.”
Read the report: citizenlab.ca/research/how-d…
Here is a small but powerful improvement to our community platform: As you enter a hostname, domain, or full URL for scanning, we can already show you whether we have scanned it before and whether we had detections of malicious activity on the domain/URL.
🇧🇷 𝗠𝗮𝗽𝗽𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗕𝗿𝗮𝗭𝗲𝘁𝘀𝘂 𝗜𝗻𝗳𝗿𝗮𝘀𝘁𝗿𝘂𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲 𝗕𝗲𝘆𝗼𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗶𝘀𝗵𝗲𝗱 𝗜𝗢𝗖𝘀
On 31 August, Group-IB published research on BraZetsu, a Nuitka-compiled Python framework it attributes to the Brazilian actor Exilware. The tool feeds a shop that sells access to compromised Windows hosts.
We ran the published indicators against our certificate inventory. Here's what came back:
→ c2.installscenter[.]com was already serving TLS on a second VPS, 80.78.27[.]252 (Njalla), from 4 April. That's almost five months before the disclosure
→ The same host presented painel.installscenter[.]com on ports 8083 and 8443, so panel and C2 shared one apex and one IP
→ The original seed IP switched to a Hestia Control Panel certificate named painel.seu-dominio[.]com in February, seen 17 times through mid-March
→ From 26 March the C2 hostname resolved to Cloudflare, but the origin kept presenting the same certificates to our scans until June
→ Hashes rotated across five versions in four months. The painel. and c2. naming on non-standard ports held from February to June
The post includes four HuntSQL queries, a timeline, new IOCs, ATT&CK mapping and detection logic.
Read the full research 👇
hunt.io/blog/brazetsu-access…
Check out our new blog layout. If you're a visual person, then this should help you navigate what we have been up to much more quickly 🥳 - urlscan.io/blog/
The urlscan Threat Research Team analyzed 75,000+ scans to surface the web's most referenced crypto addresses. Our findings uncover live EtherHiding smart contracts on Base, Polygon, and BSC Testnet using on-chain storage to evade traditional takedowns. Report on urlscan Pro.
Using the new @urlscanio Files feature, I recently uncovered a targeted Indian eChallan malware campaign! 📱 🇮🇳
🎯 Here is how the attack chain unfolded:
Our follow-up to reporting by @Manifold_ai_sec about how agents were using the urlscan platform to bypass sandbox restrictions and access websites. We discovered additional activity and the use of burner and presumably compromised API credentials: urlscan.io/blog/2026/10/01/A…
The path traversal URLs are in Nightingale's public dataset of the swarm that OpenAI acknowledged. The attempts don't appear to have worked.
Our writeup manifold.security/blog/ai-ag…