AWS services have been operating normally, however an unrelated disruption elsewhere on the internet is prompting some inaccurate news reports. The only resource on the internet that provides accurate data on the availability of our services is the #AWS Health Dashboard. We thank everyone who is confirming the facts with Amazon before publishing reports. go.aws/4iRxrm0
Remember eMudhra with their Most Secure Private Key Of All Times?
So here's how they managed to do it:
1) They exported a private key from the hardware security module (HSM) into a regular PC (!).
2) They processed this private key with a Python script they wrote (!!).
3) The script had a bug that ruined the key by truncating it to a single byte (!!!).
4) They imported the ruined key back into the HSM and certified it with the root CA.
But that's not the end of it. After the initial "ceremony", the HSM held two keys: the good original and the ruined copy.
A month later, this is what happened:
1) The certificates contained the ruined copy's public key, but the revocation lists (CRLs) were signed with the good original, so their signatures failed to verify.
2) Instead of investigating the problem, eMudhra "fixed" it by signing the CRLs with the ruined key instead.
3) The weak keys went unnoticed until an outside researcher reported them in October 2026.
Good job!
AWS quietly removed a ton of undifferentiated heavy lifting in running secure agent sandboxes yesterday and I don't think people outside my normal circle are aware of how useful this is going to be: docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/l…
AWS Community Builders isn't a reward for expertise. It's a program for people who consistently share, at any level: blogs, demos, talks, open source. Build in public first, then apply in the next cohort.
PHP sites behind Cloudflare already have an initial set of WAF rules deployed for the known exploit vectors in these vulnerabilities. The rules are available to all customers, including free.
We are seeing early attacks emerging and are updating mitigations as new vectors show up.
This is a STOPGAP only. Patch as soon as @ThePHPF releases the update at 14:00 UTC today.
This is finally out! after months of researching agents in restricted environments and getting surprising results, we can share it out with the world!
kudos to @HaiRozen, @YairAmar4 and @DDavidovich!
Today we are open-sourcing @boundarybench, a new paper, benchmark, and GitHub repo that enterprises can use to find out the REAL performance of their agents.
Boundary-Bench was developed by researchers from @Accomplish_ai and NYU, where we tested 12 frontier agents across roughly 10,000 runs, with realistic enterprise policies, simulating environments with EDR, SASE, and DLP security tools enforcing those policies.
We did this because generic leaderboard scores are being generated under conditions no security team would ever allow, which means orgs are making deployment and risk decisions based on numbers that don't hold up.
The results are surprising >>
Conclusión:
Si un dominio se cae globalmente de golpe, antes de pensar en ataques o fallas…
👉 revisa el estado WHOIS.
Muchas veces el problema no es técnico.
Es administrativo.
Fin 🧵
Entonces pasa esto:
Equipo técnico → “ya renovamos, esperemos propagación”
Realidad → el dominio sigue bloqueado
No es propagación.
Es estado del dominio.
Causas típicas de clientHold:
• correo de verificación sin confirmar
• datos de registrante sin validar
• cambio pendiente
• validación ICANN
Nada de esto es técnico.
Todo es administrativo.