Tweet below got some uptake so worth adding a couple reminders:
-one thing to say you're concerned, another thing to decide to act
-especially when lagging & worry it will be weaponized against you
-once decide to act, still need technical safety know-how, where 🇨🇳 is also behind
Yesterday, the CCP's top theoretical journal (求是, Seeking Truth) published a major piece on AI governance and risks.
I think this is clearly the strongest & most urgent language on existential risks used in such an authoritative outlet. See below for comp to recent major doc.
Yesterday, the CCP's top theoretical journal (求是, Seeking Truth) published a major piece on AI governance and risks.
I think this is clearly the strongest & most urgent language on existential risks used in such an authoritative outlet. See below for comp to recent major doc.
Important find & sharp eyes as always @mattsheehan88! This chimes with what I've been observing and wrote about, e.g. in September for @thewirechina : thewirechina.com/2026/09/29/….
It's worth noting that this latest piece echoes a point that was striking to me across Xi's July WAIC speech in Shanghai + the Cyberspace Administration's September AI risk five-point warning, which is that AI capability is possibly outpacing governance readiness. For Chinese leaders, this is a big deal and is a controllability issue. I wrote about the former for @AsiaSociety@AsiaPolicy in July: centerforchinaanalysis.asias….
Specifically, this latest piece reads: "人工智能技术的自主迭代特征,使治理对象始终处于高度不确定的动态变化中。人工智能是具备自主迭代能力的通用颠覆性技术,多模态融合、自主智能体、具身智能接连实现跨越式突破,风险场景随之持续翻新。高阶自主智能体已显现出持续自我进化的复杂特征,其能力边界难以用传统技术评估框架加以预判。这意味着人工智能全球治理面对的不是一个静态的技术应用形态,而是一个能力持续跃迁、应用场景不断拓展的变量,治理靶心始终处于移动变化中。".
Notably, elsewhere in the piece, it reads: "更令人警惕的是,前沿模型已有脱离人类约束的迹象,人工智能在智能爆发的过程中有可能发展出与人类预期不一致的目标,甚至可能出现威胁人类生存的重大安全风险。这些风险的共同特征是不分国界、传导迅速,任何单一国家的安全管控与应急处置都力有不逮。". TL;DR: Chinese elites are between moderately & very AI-safety pilled, hence 'China's AI safety catch-up is hiding in plain sight'.
All this is to say, the room for AI safety-dealmaking in the next 1-2 years is substantial, if only we can keep the political tension checked.
On this point, it's worth calling attention to this paragraph warning against export control extension and escalation, and an ideological/ values-driven approach to bilateral engagement and relationship management. It links such actions to potential damage to bilateral trust, as well as the difficulty they pose to further advancing bilateral cooperation in military AI, open-sourcing of AI, and coordinated risk assessment 'and other key domains': "地缘政治博弈激烈,严重侵蚀多边合作信任根基。百年变局下的地缘叙事向科技领域深度延伸,个别国家将人工智能泛安全化与工具化,连续多轮出台单边出口管制,人为割裂人工智能全球产业链;绕开联合国大搞俱乐部式小圈子,强行输出单一价值标准,完全排斥全球南方国家的核心诉求。这种做法不仅在事实上进一步拉大了南北智能鸿沟,更导致大国互信持续走低,军用人工智能管控、开源共享、联合风险评估等关键领域的合作难以推进。" A point that I also predicted and have been warning about esp. in the post-Busan Summit age, where it's unclear that geopolitically speaking, either side holds overwhelmingly strong bargaining chips (no pun intended): x.com/kristy_loke/status/211…
Yesterday, the CCP's top theoretical journal (求是, Seeking Truth) published a major piece on AI governance and risks.
I think this is clearly the strongest & most urgent language on existential risks used in such an authoritative outlet. See below for comp to recent major doc.
This speech, setting out PM Burnham's foreign policy logic, has some worthy elements. His core argument is that Britain engages abroad because of values, but also because global events matter materially at home. Right. But it also raises concerns... 1/5
gov.uk/government/speeches/p…
The formidable @IsabellaMWeber
"China has an extremely sophisticated system of price & supply stabilization in the essentials. Which means that if you have global energy price shocks, like the ones we have been living through, in China the prices have been completely stable...
Everyone online: OMG Qwen 4 Max is closed source, Chinese open-weight strategy is over.
In reality: It's the same strategy they've had for years. Qwen keeps the strongest model API only and has an abundant open weight strategy below that.
Thankfully. Some Chinese names can be hard to pronounce for native English speakers, but the current General Secretary's isn't. His surname sounds like the female third person pronoun, his first name like a popular drink and a sonar noise. Getting it wrong is wilfully rude.
I’ve been saying, CN AI models are departing in major ways from open source
1) some top models are not open weight (Ali is one ex, another is Seedance)
2) Kimi and others now charging cloud providers for hosting
3) export controls limiting open weight cyber, so firms tune down cyber capabilities before releasing weights
Alibaba's new Qwen4-Max model will not be open-source.
They say: "Smaller models in the family are coming to open source, built on the same lineage and trained with the same generation of techniques, tuned for what small models do best."
Just read a Chinese article calling this "the darkest moment for Chinese AI." Seeing pushback in the comments, but basically it lays out the bear case quite extensively:
1. Getting compute is harder whichever way you go. Buying advanced NVIDIA chips is difficult, renting GPUs overseas is coming under pressure, and proposed restrictions on chipmaking equipment could make domestic alternatives harder to produce too.
2. Catching up could get a lot more expensive. If learning from leading models’ outputs aka distillaion becomes harder, Chinese labs have to spend more on their own data, experiments and training. That gets uncomfortable if investors are also losing patience. Independent labs don’t have an advertising or e-commerce business to pay the bills.
3. Robot-brain startups could find their advantage disappearing. Frontier labs are moving into robotics, potentially eating into what specialist models can offer. Meanwhile, robots still have to make economic sense against China’s relatively low labor costs.
4. More users don’t necessarily mean enough revenue. China has huge digital audiences, but getting people and businesses to pay sustainably for AI is another question. Everyone is competing on price, American models are getting cheaper too, and research isn’t getting cheaper.
5. Even the areas where China already leads face risks. Optical-component suppliers are benefiting from AI infrastructure spending, but proposed US restrictions could threaten access to major customers.
That’s a lot hitting at once. The worry is that companies keep making better models while needing more money to stay competitive, without earning enough to fund the next round.
Now, it feels like every six months it is a "darkest moment" for Chinese AI. But I think these are real concerns. We'll focus on this topic at @techbuzzchina (and present some hope, I think) next week.
NEW: The Department of Commerce just published new AI and semiconductor export control regulations that close some major loopholes in existing export controls. The regulation includes new rules to: (1) counter Chinese smuggling of AI chips; (2) restrict Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips; and (3) block Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC.
These rules are a major step forward. They still contain some key gaps that need to be filled urgently in a follow-up rule, namely, they do not block Chinese companies from buying AI chips inside the United States or renting access to AI chips at US-based data centers. However, this rule will help and is the first good-faith effort to actually close loopholes in export controls in a year and a half. Hopefully more will follow.
1. Countering Chinese smuggling of AI chips. The rule expands export controls on AI chips to five new countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil. It does not block AI chip orders to these countries, but requires a US government review (unless it is a US company that meets certain requirements). This is a massively needed step. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have been the second, fourth, fifth, and eighth biggest importers of AI chips this year.
The rule doesn’t cover Taiwan itself, where chip smuggling is a massive issue (exports of AI chips to China are still not illegal under Taiwanese law), and still doesn’t prevent AI chip sales to Chinese companies in the United States, which somehow remain legal. Ultimately, large orders of AI chips by untrusted companies in any country should require a license to fully combat smuggling, as Chinese companies will move to buy AI chips anywhere there isn’t a license requirement. But this is a start.
2. Restricting Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips. The rule creates a new remote access control that restricts companies from providing Chinese companies with remote access to AI chips. It requires a US export license to provide Chinese companies with access to 12 million TPP or more (equivalent to ~200 of the most advanced Blackwell chips, or ~800 H100 chips). This applies to chips already shipped, as well as all future shipments. Some of these requirements even apply retroactively; Commerce says existing rules already barred data supplying a majority of a data center’s compute to Chinese companies, and tells companies that violated this to self-disclose. This effectively kills the business of neoclouds like Megaspeed that exist to provide remote access to large amounts of AI compute to China.
The biggest gap is the remote access controls do not apply to data centers in the United States. So Chinese companies can legally train on large numbers of Blackwells at data centers in Northern Virginia. This gap should be closed immediately with a new rule that uses Commerce’s US persons authority to capture this activity. The rule also exempts recommendation algorithms, so impact will depend on enforcement. Last, new authorities included in the text of the AI Overwatch Act would strengthen Commerce's ability to enforce these controls--that bill should pass immediately.
3. Blocking Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC. The rule closes loopholes in existing controls that Chinese companies are likely exploiting to illicitly make AI chips at TSMC or Samsung. Specifically, it now requires any Chinese chip designer who is seeking to make a 16/14nm or more advanced chip at TSMC/Samsung to get a U.S. export license, and restores old rules that weren’t being enforced until now that require any untrusted company anywhere in the world to get a license to make an AI chip at TSMC or Samsung. This is a significant upgrade.
Overall, this is a major step forward to countering Chinese smuggling of and access to advanced AI chips. The work here is not done, as there are some critical loopholes that remain open and need to be closed in a follow-up rule (namely those related to activities inside the United States). Commerce should move extremely quickly to close these. But this is the first time in over 18 months that the administration is starting to take export controls seriously, and does represent a meaningful step forward.
Last, the fact that the Commerce press release says this rule was “written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council” is remarkable and unprecedented. I have never seen a BIS rule that was not written by BIS. That implies that Commerce was dragged kicking and screaming over the finish line by the White House and Treasury, and instructed to publish this rule rather than the rumored weaker one that it preferred. Remarkable.
"This effectively kills the business of neoclouds like Megaspeed that exist to provide remote access to large amounts of AI compute to China. The biggest gap is the remote access controls do not apply to data centers in the United States. So Chinese companies can legally train on large numbers of Blackwells at data centers in Northern Virginia."
NEW: The Department of Commerce just published new AI and semiconductor export control regulations that close some major loopholes in existing export controls. The regulation includes new rules to: (1) counter Chinese smuggling of AI chips; (2) restrict Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips; and (3) block Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC.
These rules are a major step forward. They still contain some key gaps that need to be filled urgently in a follow-up rule, namely, they do not block Chinese companies from buying AI chips inside the United States or renting access to AI chips at US-based data centers. However, this rule will help and is the first good-faith effort to actually close loopholes in export controls in a year and a half. Hopefully more will follow.
1. Countering Chinese smuggling of AI chips. The rule expands export controls on AI chips to five new countries: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Brazil. It does not block AI chip orders to these countries, but requires a US government review (unless it is a US company that meets certain requirements). This is a massively needed step. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia have been the second, fourth, fifth, and eighth biggest importers of AI chips this year.
The rule doesn’t cover Taiwan itself, where chip smuggling is a massive issue (exports of AI chips to China are still not illegal under Taiwanese law), and still doesn’t prevent AI chip sales to Chinese companies in the United States, which somehow remain legal. Ultimately, large orders of AI chips by untrusted companies in any country should require a license to fully combat smuggling, as Chinese companies will move to buy AI chips anywhere there isn’t a license requirement. But this is a start.
2. Restricting Chinese companies from renting access to AI chips. The rule creates a new remote access control that restricts companies from providing Chinese companies with remote access to AI chips. It requires a US export license to provide Chinese companies with access to 12 million TPP or more (equivalent to ~200 of the most advanced Blackwell chips, or ~800 H100 chips). This applies to chips already shipped, as well as all future shipments. Some of these requirements even apply retroactively; Commerce says existing rules already barred data supplying a majority of a data center’s compute to Chinese companies, and tells companies that violated this to self-disclose. This effectively kills the business of neoclouds like Megaspeed that exist to provide remote access to large amounts of AI compute to China.
The biggest gap is the remote access controls do not apply to data centers in the United States. So Chinese companies can legally train on large numbers of Blackwells at data centers in Northern Virginia. This gap should be closed immediately with a new rule that uses Commerce’s US persons authority to capture this activity. The rule also exempts recommendation algorithms, so impact will depend on enforcement. Last, new authorities included in the text of the AI Overwatch Act would strengthen Commerce's ability to enforce these controls--that bill should pass immediately.
3. Blocking Chinese chip designers from making AI chips at TSMC. The rule closes loopholes in existing controls that Chinese companies are likely exploiting to illicitly make AI chips at TSMC or Samsung. Specifically, it now requires any Chinese chip designer who is seeking to make a 16/14nm or more advanced chip at TSMC/Samsung to get a U.S. export license, and restores old rules that weren’t being enforced until now that require any untrusted company anywhere in the world to get a license to make an AI chip at TSMC or Samsung. This is a significant upgrade.
Overall, this is a major step forward to countering Chinese smuggling of and access to advanced AI chips. The work here is not done, as there are some critical loopholes that remain open and need to be closed in a follow-up rule (namely those related to activities inside the United States). Commerce should move extremely quickly to close these. But this is the first time in over 18 months that the administration is starting to take export controls seriously, and does represent a meaningful step forward.
Last, the fact that the Commerce press release says this rule was “written by and at the direction of the Department of Treasury and the National Security Council” is remarkable and unprecedented. I have never seen a BIS rule that was not written by BIS. That implies that Commerce was dragged kicking and screaming over the finish line by the White House and Treasury, and instructed to publish this rule rather than the rumored weaker one that it preferred. Remarkable.
Folks:
1) you can argue that we ought to have more stringent export controls viz China, without suggesting that all Chinese are intel assets
2) you can call out overheated & sometimes borderline racist rhetoric, without dismissing legit concerns about evasion of export controls
One of those weird doublespeak essays in which the author begins by accusing China of seeking global hegemony, but then somehow spends most of the essay conceding that China isn’t actually behaving like an aspiring hegemon (and instead seems genuinely interested in setting up a multipolar world). Given the latter, why indulge the former kind of DC and Brussels political correctness at all? ft.com/content/fb667289-ae81…
Perhaps rather than reading these as "output gaps" we should read the graph as a map of how the "horizon of expectation" formed at different points in Poland's growth trajectory has been broken and adjusted downwards.
If you want to see some scary output gaps, you just have to look at Poland, which is back to post-2008 output gap levels. This is going on all across Eastern Europe and Germany isn't far behind. The war in Ukraine is a big deflationary shock for Europe...
robinjbrooks.substack.com/p/…