Hell. Yes.
I’m so proud of the work the team did on this. We took a fresh approach, a break from the “annual report” mold, and I couldn’t be happier with the results.
Six observations in the new 𝘵𝘩𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘵𝘴, 𝘦𝘵𝘤 report, all of them on software you already trust.
• AI clients as execution parents
• A worm with npm publish rights
• ClickFix on macOS
• ROPC past Conditional Access
• Blockchain C2 in commodity loaders
• 8 minutes from stealer to login
Access the full report: go.es.io/4z3fyGK
Elastic Security Labs Threat Command detected a credential-stealing supply-chain attack using a malicious version of the Microsoft project agent-framework (1.26.1 and 1.26.2) at 3:41 PM EST on November 17, 2026. There appears to be an additional file (_telemetry.py and af_runtime_diag.py) added to the packages, aimed at Azure cloud workloads and CI/CD build agents.
It’s disguised as a harmless “runtime diagnostics helper”, but steals environment variables, credential files, OIDC tokens, and managed identity tokens. The attack chain exfiltrates to the endpoint: webhook[.]site/d381fd80-ec62-42ad-8f5c-d1b15103c9bb.
If you installed agent-framework (1.26.1, 1.26.2), we recommend removing it, pinning to 1.26.0, and rotating any credentials accessible from that environment, since the release steals secrets and Azure tokens.
Package URL:
pypi.org/project/agent-frame…pypi.org/project/agent-frame…
User-Agent: af-runtime-diagnostics/1
We're tracking REF3364, a Linux cryptomining intrusion that combines custom malware with publicly available miners.
Full analysis by @soolidsnakee, with YARA rules for SANSAR and netns, MITRE ATT&CK mapping and IOCs: go.es.io/4sW0SYE
The actor abused an exposed Ray job agent, obtaining root and deploying the toolkit across 3 Linux GPU hosts.
The toolkit includes SANSAR, a Rust orchestrator that uses Tor for C2 and supervises CPU and GPU miners. Its command handlers support miner configuration and interactive shells.
The actor also deployed:
• A kernel rootkit that hides selected processes, files and socket entries
• An NVML wrapper that falsifies GPU readings
• netns, a separate backdoor that retrieves its C2 address from an Ethereum smart contract before connecting to the server directly
Using public blockchains to locate C2 infrastructure is a pattern we also discussed in our 2026 Threat Command quarterly report.
Attackers are using legitimate AI coding assistants to execute malicious commands on compromised endpoints.
In two confirmed intrusions, Elastic Threat Command observed adversaries operating cyber attacks through Claude Code on Windows and the ChatGPT desktop app on macOS. Both involved trusted applications being used to carry out malicious activity.
@_xDeJesus principal security research engineer at Elastic Threat Command, walks through the findings and what security teams should be looking for: go.es.io/47ZcxMM
The findings highlight a detection challenge: These applications are signed and authorized to execute commands, making it difficult to distinguish legitimate activity from attacker behavior.
The speed of these attacks is another concern. Elastic researchers observed an average of just eight minutes between ClickFix/infostealer infection and attackers logging in with stolen credentials.
In the latest threats, etc quarterly report, Elastic Threat Command documents these intrusions and examines the implications for endpoint visibility, behavioral detection, and threat hunting.
Full report: go.es.io/4sO5G2k
Microsoft wants EDR out of the Windows kernel. We checked the binaries
They even come with public symbols. Full write-up from @zodiacon : go.es.io/4zcdL2U
Microsoft's answer is the Windows Endpoint Security Platform (WESP). It's undocumented, but it already ships in Windows Insider builds.
What we found:
• wesp.sys: a Microsoft-built file system mini-filter at altitude 329500
• EspFilterPort: the filter communication port it uses to reach user mode
• espclient.dll: 120 Esp* exports for rules, filters and event queues
Two critical PHP RCEs are patched: CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, both CVSS 9.2.
• Fixed in 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, and 8.2.35.
You can still focus on detection coverage today.
Security Labs writeup (coverage + guidance): elastic.co/security-labs/thr…
Most PHP RCEs converge on the same outcome, whatever the bug: a web server process (php-fpm, php-cgi, apache2, httpd) doing something a request-serving daemon almost never does legitimately.
• a shell to confirm access: id, whoami, uname -a
• a second stage pulled in: curl http://... | bash
• a reverse shell: bash -i >& /dev/tcp//
• a webshell written into the web root
The bug class is public now: out-of-memory corruption, and stale state reused by the same worker. The behavior is what you detect.
We recently ran a different PHP RCE end-to-end (wp2shell): apache2 spawning dash to run id; whoami; hostname fired the exact rules that we suspect to catch php2shell. Payload Execution by Web Server kills the shell on the endpoint.
The Suspicious/Unusual Command, Child, and File Creation via Web Server rules stack on top.
(PHP did confirm partial php.ini mitigations. session.upload_progress.enabled=0 blocks the confirmed session paths only. Patch is still the fix.)
Patch to 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, or 8.2.35. Verify that the stack is enabled now.
Guidance + every rule link below.
I used Opus 5.5 on max and GPT-6 Astra for 5 days straight and I reversed engineered Elastic Security and extracted all the rules. I made them available here:
github.com/elastic/detection…
You’re welcome.
There are plenty of ways to build a detection lab, but elastic-container is the fastest Elastic stack setup I know.
One script gives you:
- Elasticsearch + Kibana + Fleet
- Detection Engine on, prebuilt rules bulk-enabled by OS
- 100% containerized, one command up or down
Have Claude or Codex set it up for you. Credit: Andrew Pease (@andythevariable).
github.com/peasead/elastic-c…
🚨 KREMLIN banking malware bypasses Chromium integrity checks to install a Chrome and Edge extension that steals credentials and session tokens.
It also uses Ethereum smart contracts to rotate C2 and payload locations.
How the attack chain works: thehackernews.com/2026/09/kr…
RE work by @cyril_t_f uncovered a kill switch in the implant for an NX domain, so we registered it.
It was rewarding to see the implants checking in and then terminating - hopefully giving defenders detections and time to remediate.
KREMLIN is a multi-stage credential theft toolkit targeting Brazilian banking users.
New research from Elastic Security Labs (REF9334): go.es.io/4yfkg4R by @cyril_t_f and @andythevariable
The infection chain combines JavaScript loaders, an optional PE injector, and a custom C++ installer. The installer downloads and installs a malicious browser extension for Chrome and Edge and/or deploys an embedded PULSAR or REMCOS RAT. This malicious extension is then used for web-browser data interception and exfiltration.
KREMLIN resolves its C2 endpoints from Ethereum. Smart contracts store payload URLs and extension download locations as on-chain key-value pairs. The operators update endpoints by writing a new transaction.
The extension installation bypasses Chromium's integrity system. The installer launches Chrome under a debugger, recovers the App-Bound OSCrypt key from process memory, extracts the seed from resources.pak, then regenerates the HMACs and encrypted SHA-256 hashes that Secure Preferences requires. The extension registers silently with developer mode forced on.
Once active, it logs input fields, intercepts HTTP requests by configurable URL and method rules, injects attacker-controlled HTML, and exfiltrates intercepted data, cookies, and credentials over WebSocket and HTTP.
Elastic Security Labs Threat Command registered the network canary domain that operates as a kill switch. We observed thousands of implants from Brazil attempting to check in to this domain. Once this domain was live, the KREMLIN loaders crash before trying to update or install the final payload, temporarily disrupting this campaign.
The targeting is clear. Lure filenames impersonate PIX transfers, bank statements, and receipts from Banco do Brasil, Bradesco, Sicoob, Santander, C6 Bank, and PagBank. Ethereum transaction timestamps cluster in São Paulo working hours. Portuguese-language artifacts appear throughout the codebase.
We reproduced the new Log4j 2 deserialization bug on official 2.26.1 JARs.
Getting to command execution took two things Log4j does not ship:
- A process still deserializing serialized LogEvent objects
- A gadget library already on that JVM
log4j-api and log4j-core alone were not enough.
So here is what to hunt for: Java accepting a network connection, followed by spawning a suspicious child process.
That is post-exploitation behaviour, not a signature of the bug itself.
Treat it as possible gadget execution and check the JVM.
ES|QL hunt queries and affected versions are in the post.
How the bypass works, which versions carry it, and what to hunt for by @RFGroenewoud and @bryans3c : go.es.io/4y8b0ih
We reverse engineered malware built to kill our own EDR.
In August 2026, eSentire documented a ClickFix campaign selling a DLL sideloader as a service.
It drops a malicious mscoree.dll next to a signed Microsoft binary, vb7to8.exe. Windows loads the planted copy first. Attacker code then runs inside a trusted process.
The kit also ships a vulnerable driver (BYOVD) to disable EDR, including Elastic Endpoint.
So we rebuilt it. A NativeAOT .NET 7 library, exports faked, a module initializer that fires on load.
We dropped it beside vb7to8.exe and ran it.
Elastic Defend 9.5.0 flagged the load as DLL Hijack: Masquerading.
Detecting this before 9.5.0 took ~88 lines and a list of ~2,600 library names. Now it's one line.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1574.001 (Hijack Execution Flow: DLL), T1036 (Masquerading).
Reverse engineering walkthrough, the .NET rebuild, and the detection breakdownby @0xfluxsec and @django88_: go.es.io/4xw6o5G
Original campaign research by @eSentire.
Elastic Security Labs is tracking Golden Gh0st RAT targeting Western companies, expanding beyond its previously documented targeting of financial organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.
Same TTPs as @ExpelSecurity CylindricalCanine research post: go.es.io/3TEZ0G6
The initial payload was delivered as a fake screenshot with a .pif extension, signed with a revoked certificate and hosted on myphotos[.]s[.]gy.
Follow-on payloads were staged in a public Google Cloud Storage bucket at storage[.]googleapis[.]com/nikeupdat/.
Multiple stages, and every one is either validly code-signed or never exists on disk as an executable.
Abused code-signing certificates, all valid at time of use.
Two are EV, same CA, both dated 2026-07, issued to two different "Private Organization" subjects:
- 杭州思维宇宙科技有限公司 (Hangzhou Siwei Yuzhou Technology), thumbprint: 14E0FCA3F0F656D1AF6EA66E1B2B7C6B4ACD8E2D
- Dongguan Jieshan Technology Co., Ltd, thumbprint: C29C3C494A348EA879ABFF50DD56B85E9CB6366A
IOCs:
api[.]probref[.]com:5188 (C2)
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/nikeupdat/
myphotos[.]s[.]gy
5ef6019fb6ee1db1201ee479a68669b47eb0d5d82770dbd30b05f46ccbc68f4f
b6cb6d5de2c62aa1351b1b240dc223c3d6fa95083cf43b2866d84a8a6c4d0446
A new Shai-Hulud campaign deployed a self-propagating worm across the npm supply chain.
Our supply chain monitor caught it yesterday, August 4th. The campaign targeted keyv: 600 million monthly downloads.
CHAINDROP activates on stolen npm tokens with write permissions, then backdoors every package the victim controls.
Over 400 npm packages compromised.
Full research and IOCs in the blog: go.es.io/4pUx39a
Elastic Security Labs is tracking Golden Gh0st RAT targeting Western companies, expanding beyond its previously documented targeting of financial organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.
Same TTPs as @ExpelSecurity CylindricalCanine research post: go.es.io/3TEZ0G6
The initial payload was delivered as a fake screenshot with a .pif extension, signed with a revoked certificate and hosted on myphotos[.]s[.]gy.
Follow-on payloads were staged in a public Google Cloud Storage bucket at storage[.]googleapis[.]com/nikeupdat/.
Multiple stages, and every one is either validly code-signed or never exists on disk as an executable.
Abused code-signing certificates, all valid at time of use.
Two are EV, same CA, both dated 2026-07, issued to two different "Private Organization" subjects:
- 杭州思维宇宙科技有限公司 (Hangzhou Siwei Yuzhou Technology), thumbprint: 14E0FCA3F0F656D1AF6EA66E1B2B7C6B4ACD8E2D
- Dongguan Jieshan Technology Co., Ltd, thumbprint: C29C3C494A348EA879ABFF50DD56B85E9CB6366A
IOCs:
api[.]probref[.]com:5188 (C2)
storage[.]googleapis[.]com/nikeupdat/
myphotos[.]s[.]gy
5ef6019fb6ee1db1201ee479a68669b47eb0d5d82770dbd30b05f46ccbc68f4f
b6cb6d5de2c62aa1351b1b240dc223c3d6fa95083cf43b2866d84a8a6c4d0446
When the attacker is an autonomous agent, outcome detections beat process tree trust.
OpenAI's eval models escaped a research sandbox during ExploitGym testing. The agent exploited a package-registry zero-day, reached the open internet, and hit Hugging Face's dataset processing pipeline.
Hugging Face reconstructed 17,000+ events from the intrusion. The TTPs were conventional: dataset pipeline RCE, credential harvest, lateral movement, self-migrating C2. The speed and alert volume were not.
We mapped MITRE ATT&CK and ATLAS stages to production Elastic Defend and SIEM rules you can enable today.
Full campaign analysis on the blog: go.es.io/4bg3sRK