❗️C’est avec une grande émotion que je vous annonce la parution de mon livre ce jeudi 20 avril. Une plongée ajournée depuis 30 ans dans la littérature militaire #russe post-soviétique (revues, journaux, dico/encyclo mili du minDef RU, discours des off. mili, doctrines off. etc.)
Une opération psychologique russe parfaitement réussie : Moscou menace la France, et l’un des responsables politiques français les plus influents relaie aussitôt cette menace pour appeler à la retenue. Difficile d’imaginer une réaction plus conforme aux attentes du Kremlin.
For Putin, Ukrainian identity is an anomaly to be corrected. If Russians and Ukrainians are “one people,” their separation must stem from a conspiracy. Ukrainian resistance does not disprove his belief: it only reveals the extent of the distortion to be corrected.
Apparently, Russian imperialism is a myth, American foreign policy is responsible for Putin’s authoritarian consolidation, and the Kremlin bears little responsibility for either. Quite a remarkable rewriting of recent Russian history.
Why is it so difficult to acknowledge Russian agency?
Putin has spent decades questioning Ukrainian sovereignty, denying the existence of a distinct Ukrainian nation, and asserting Russia’s right to determine its neighbors’ political future. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, launched a full-scale invasion in 2022, and subsequently claimed to annex four more Ukrainian regions.
Calling Russian imperial ambitions an “esoteric mythology” requires ignoring not only Putin’s actions, but also his own words. As he wrote in July 2021, seven months before the invasion: “I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia.”
Equally astonishing is the suggestion that “American adventurism” explains Putin’s authoritarian consolidation. Even before becoming president in 2000, Putin asserted that Russia had developed from the outset as a “super-centralized state,” a characteristic “embedded in its genetic code, its traditions, and the mentality of its people.” His conception of centralized authority was rooted in his understanding of Russian history and society, not simply in reactions to American foreign policy.
Nor can the Kremlin’s perception of the West be understood simply as a response to recent American policies. In March 2014, Putin declared: “The infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today.” When Western hostility is imagined as a centuries-old constant, almost any development can be interpreted as further evidence of it.
The Kremlin is not merely reacting to Washington. It has ambitions, interests, ideological convictions, and political responsibilities of its own. It also chooses when to act, often when it perceives the West as vulnerable, as illustrated by Putin’s Munich speech in 2007, the war in Georgia in 2008, and Russia’s ultimatums in 2021.
The irony is striking: where the Kremlin sees a deliberate American strategy to undermine Russia, some Western critics see reckless US policies that supposedly provoked an inevitable Russian response. Different interpretations, same underlying logic: Washington acts, Moscow merely reacts, and the countries caught between them are denied agency of their own.
Interesting, insightful. Of course Kremlin’s key demand was about Ukraine’s NATO membership. The ultimatum was triggered by the US-Ukrainian strategic partnership charter adopted a few weeks earlier. That document put Ukraine’s Nato membership ahead of everything else.
Had the US accepted that Russian demand, the all-out invasion would have most likely been averted at the cost of a light embarrassment, rather than epic devastation of a large European nation.
It’s doesn’t in any way justify the act of Russian aggression and resulting atrocities - this crime is solely on Putin’s regime.
But the events of 2021 serve as a reminder that the “Nato has never been on the cards” narrative is mendacious, just like the entire esoteric mythology about Putin’s motives in the conflict - empire building, conquering Europe and all that.
Putin was facing a brewing middle class revolution since 2011. American adventurism in the ex-USSR helped him to suppress it, justify political terror and consolidate support.
The Kremlin’s obsession is not NATO expansion. It is the loss of control over its neighbors.
NATO is a problem for Moscow precisely because it makes that control harder to restore.
Confusing these two things has distorted the Western debate on Russia for decades.
Russia wants Washington to recognize its right to constrain the sovereignty of other European states in the name of its own security. This is what Moscow's reported demands in Abu Dhabi reveal.
Far from being new, this ambition has shaped Russia's attempts to reshape the European security order, from Medvedev's proposals in 2008-2009 to the ultimatums of December 2021.
Russia has long insisted that negotiations with Washington should concern a comprehensive European settlement, not merely Ukraine. In Moscow's view, Ukraine's future is primarily for Russia to determine, while the West should end its support for Kyiv. If there is to be a deal with the West, it must be a grand bargain, not simply an agreement over Ukraine.
The demands concerning Finland, the Baltic states and Moldova reveal what such a settlement is meant to achieve: a privileged say over the strategic choices of other European states, leaving their security dependent on Moscow's goodwill.
Moscow's proposed concessions are equally revealing: it offers to remove its nuclear weapons from Belarus and withdraw its troops from Transnistria in exchange for lasting restrictions on its neighbours' sovereignty. An asymmetry between reversible military concessions and structural political gains.
Tactically, these maximalist demands may allow Moscow to test how far Washington is willing to negotiate over Europe's future without the Europeans, shift the negotiating baseline in its favour, and encourage Washington to pressure Ukraine and its European allies into making concessions. If talks fail, Moscow can then blame their intransigence while continuing the war.
These demands ultimately illustrate why Russia's grievances about Europe's security architecture should not automatically be mistaken for the underlying causes of its aggression. What Moscow presents as security guarantees amounts to a demand for recognition of its right to constrain the sovereignty of its neighbours.
Russia demands Finland leave NATO and the alliance abandon bases in the Baltic states
These “conditions” were put forward by the Russian delegation during recent trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi, BILD reports.
Moscow proposes keeping occupied Ukrainian territories and taking all of Donbas, including Kyiv-controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk.
The plan also requires NATO to drop military bases in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and Finland to leave the military alliance.
Ukraine would get non-aligned status and renounce NATO membership, though EU membership is not ruled out. Odesa and Mykolaiv ports would be demilitarized. Agreements on free navigation in the Black and Baltic Seas are also envisaged.
Russia also wants Moldova turned into a federal republic including Moldova, Gagauzia and Transnistria. If Moldova joins the EU, Transnistria and Gagauzia could hold independence referendums.
In exchange, Moscow offers to withdraw nuclear weapons from Belarus, abandon intermediate-range missiles there, and pull troops from Transnistria.
Medinsky's statement is hardly surprising. The mere fact that Putin has once again appointed him to lead the Russian delegation speaks volumes about Putin's willingness to make meaningful concessions.
His continued role as Russia's chief negotiator since 2022 suggests that the central issue remains Ukraine's very existence as an independent state, rather than primarily Europe's security architecture or economic and energy considerations.
⚡️ “Every inch of Russian land will be returned to Russia one way or another,”
Chief Russian negotiator Vladimir Medinsky says immediately after the conclusion of peace talks.
The issue is not whether European security should be discussed in future negotiations. Of course it should. The issue is the assumption that Russia's dissatisfaction with the European security order is a fundamental cause of its aggression, rather than potentially an expression, instrument, and justification of its ambitions to dominate its neighbors.
The fact that Moscow has repeatedly demanded a revision of that order does not establish that its grievances explain the war, let alone that accommodating them would prevent another one.
What if the problem is not primarily the European security architecture, but the Kremlin's unwillingness to accept the sovereignty and strategic autonomy of its neighbors? What if what Moscow presents as a security problem is, in fact, a problem of lost dominance? What if its perception of a hostile security environment is itself shaped by ambitions that no decent security arrangement could satisfy?
A durable peace requires credible deterrence, a militarily capable Ukraine, and effective security guarantees. It does not necessarily require resolving Russia's grievances about the European order, particularly when those grievances may be inseparable from its determination to dominate its neighbors.
Whatever one thinks of the ideas being mooted on European security, it's hard to imagine a durable end to the war that does not address broader regional issues. That's not a "Kremlin talking point." It's reality. 1/5
🌍 🇺🇦 De l'Afrique à l'Ukraine : enquête auprès de prisonniers de guerre africains, par Thierry Vircoulon, chercheur associé @Afrique_IFRI.
Ce travail est le résultat d’une dizaine d’entretiens effectués dans un centre de détention de prisonniers de guerre en Ukraine en juin 2026. Arrivés en Russie en 2024 et 2025, la plupart de ces prisonniers ont été capturés sur le front pendant l’hiver 2025/2026.
🔎 À lire : ifri.org/fr/notes/de-lafriqu…
🌍🇷🇺 À la veille du sommet Russie-Afrique de Moscou (28-29 octobre), une question absente de l’agenda officiel : le recrutement de combattants Africains dans l’armée russe.
Thierry Vircoulon @Afrique_IFRI a enquêté auprès de prisonniers de guerre africains détenus en Ukraine. 🇺🇦
🔗 Lire la note sur le site de l'Ifri : ifri.org/fr/notes/de-lafriqu…
🔊 Écouter le podcast : ifri.org/fr/audio-le-monde-s…
Pour Poutine, l’identité ukrainienne est une anomalie à corriger. Si Russes et Ukrainiens sont « un seul peuple », leur séparation résulte d’un complot. Leur résistance ne dément pas sa croyance : elle mesure l’ampleur de la déformation à corriger.
🇺🇸 "Trump a renoncé au seul levier vraiment crédible pour pousser la Russie à un accord de paix, c'est-à-dire une aide militaire massive à l'Ukraine", explique @DimitriMinic, chercheur @IfriRNV.
Selon lui, les concessions économiques accordées à Moscou risquent davantage d'encourager la Russie à poursuivre la guerre que de favoriser la paix.
🔊 À réécouter sur @franceculture ⤵️ radiofrance.fr/franceculture…
Heureux d'avoir modéré le premier panel du Forum France-Ukraine. Un grand merci à nos amis ukrainiens pour leurs interventions et leurs éclairages.
Un constat essentiel : l'Ukraine refuse d'occuper la place que la Russie entend lui assigner, mais aussi celle que ses partenaires sont parfois tentés de lui attribuer. Indispensable pour penser l'avenir de l'Ukraine et la sécurité européenne.