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Felipe Augusto Machado4,446 posts
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Felipe Augusto Machado

@FelipeAugMac

Servidor Público Federal (EPPGG) // Mestre em Políticas Públicas e Desenvolvimento // Especialista em Planejamento e Estratégias de Desenvolvimento

◷ Joined December 2017▧ 985 Photos and videos
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Felipe Augusto Machado@FelipeAugMac·Jul 2

País sem futuro? Em novo artigo para a Carta Capital (@cartacapital), tento demonstrar o tamanho da distância que nos separa do mundo desenvolvido, como ela aumentou nas últimas décadas e por que somente uma alteração radical da estratégia nacional poderá nos tornar desenvolvidos em poucas gerações. A boa notícia é que, assim como no caso da seleção brasileira de futebol, nossa própria história traz motivos para otimismo. O caminho parece estar na retomada de características que um dia nutriram o sonho do país do futuro: liderança, fortalecimento e planejamento estatal, desenvolvimento das capacidades produtivas, ambição e ousadia. Fontes: Memórias de Chen Yizi. Em: Weber, Isabella. How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate. @IsabellaMWeber PIB per capita de 1930 a 1980: Maddison Project, PPC, dólares de 2011. PIB per capita de 1990 até hoje: Banco Mundial, PPC, dólares internacionais de 2021. PIB per capita, crescimento anual (%): Banco Mundial, dólares de 2015. Zweig, Stefan. Brasil, país do futuro.

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Felipe Augusto Machado@FelipeAugMac·Nov 15

O freio de um carro elétrico da Huawei falhou em um teste de segurança. A reação predominante dos internautas chineses foi proteger a empresa, criticando a certificadora e até a mídia ligada ao governo, pois a Huawei, que se tornou alvo de sanções dos EUA, se tornou um orgulho nacional. thinkchina.sg/society/huawei…

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Jonathan Cheng@JChengWSJ·Nov 5

NYT: China’s Message to Its Rivals: You Need What We Make—It’s not just rare earths. China is making it harder for other countries to shed their dependence on its solar, drone and drugmaking technology. @dhpierson nytimes.com/2026/11/02/world…

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Estadão 🗞️@Estadao·Nov 8

AGRONEGÓCIO | O último plano quinquenal da China prevê reduzir em cerca de 26% as compras de soja até 2035, com foco em produção doméstica e menor dependência externa. Em 2025, o país importou um recorde de 111,83 milhões de toneladas, das quais 85,4 milhões vieram do Brasil. Se a estratégia se consolidar, o setor brasileiro terá desafios pela frente. 🔗Saiba mais no x.gd/Y782HF

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Kyle Chan@kyleichan·Nov 2

China’s Fifth Plenum decision is out. Beijing wants the Party to have more influence in private tech firms. “Strengthen Party-building efforts in platform companies, technology-innovation enterprises, and other such firms; establish a mechanism for dynamically adjusting the elevation of Party organizations within internet companies to higher administrative levels of management; and ensure that responsibilities for Party-building are fulfilled.”

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Felipe Augusto Machado@FelipeAugMac·Nov 2

Artigo do Banco Mundial de 1995 sobre o milagre sul-coreano: Política macroeconômica: "Nas 3 décadas de alto crescimento, a política macroeconômica foi amplamente favorável à industrialização". Moeda desvalorizada: "0 Governo estabeleceu o valor real da moeda no nível necessário para assegurar a competitividade das exportações do país". O Governo também atuou para fazer da moeda coreana a mais estável do mundo em desenvolvimento. "Claramente, ter mantido uma taxa de câmbio competitiva foi crítico para a estratégia de crescimento liderada pelas exportações, em claro contraste com as experiências dos países latino-americanos". Inflação: "A Coreia não foi tão bem sucedida no controle à inflação. Pedidos para controlar a inflação foram frequentemente superados pela estratégia de desenvolvimento orientada para o crescimento econômico". Na maior parte do período a inflação superou 15% ao ano. Chegou a bater em 30%. Raramente ficou abaixo de 5%. Política fiscal expansionista: "foi a necessária para abastecer a política industrial... Entre 1967 e 1982, o setor público apresentou déficits persistentes de 2% do PIB em média. Desde cedo, o Governo reconheceu a importância de fortalecer a infraestrutura, a defesa e o sistema educacional para apoiar sua estratégia de crescimento econômico e garantir a segurança nacional". Política industrial: "A política industrial buscava objetivos claros e de longo prazo, e várias políticas foram direcionadas para esses objetivos em um processo que muitas vezes faltou em outros países em desenvolvimento". No milagre sul-coreano, a política macroeconômica serviu à estratégia nacional de desenvolvimento. Ou, se preferirem, serviu à política industrial, o que dava na mesma.

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Dina D. Pomeranz 🟣@DinaPomeranz·Oct 31

People often say: "Why focus on economic growth and GDP per Capita? Other things are much more important than money." Here is the thing: many of those other things correlate strongly with GDP per capita.

maximo rossi@naeetlnNFT Oct 31

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Kyle Chan@kyleichan·Oct 31

Why is China so obsessed with holding on to traditional industries? Aren’t they focused on high-tech growth? Key reasons as laid out by NDRC: 1. They’re the foundation of the “real economy” and enable new high-tech industries. 2. Traditional industries may have started earlier but innovation and progress in them continues. 3. Employment—they can provide high-quality jobs through industrial upgrading. Quote from a Q&A with reporters: Reporter from Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao: Amid the wave of high-tech development, how can China’s traditional industries transform themselves while continuing to create jobs? Fu Jiuling, Director-General of the Department of Industrial Development, National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC): The Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan lays out a blueprint for industrial development over the next five years, and it has attracted a great deal of attention. When we talk about technological revolutions and industrial transformation, it is easy to think of emerging industries and industries of the future while overlooking traditional industries. Some even believe that cultivating new growth drivers means traditional industries are no longer important. At the same time, many people are concerned about the impact of industrial upgrading on employment. I would like to make three points. First, the transformation of traditional industries toward newer and higher-quality development has always been underway and has never stopped. We often say that each generation of manufacturing processes, materials, and equipment represents a new stage of technological iteration and industrial upgrading. Experience shows that there are only outdated products, not outdated industries. Although traditional industries have been around for a long time, they should not be equated with low-end or backward industries. Consider people’s everyday needs for clothing, food, housing, and transportation. Today’s clothing fabrics are incomparably better than those of the past. Bicycles are also becoming lighter, with some now incorporating carbon fiber. It is fair to say that the so-called traditional industries we see today are very different from what they were several decades ago, or even just a few years ago. The vitality of traditional industries—like old trees sprouting new shoots—is evident everywhere in our daily lives. Second, traditional industries are the foundation of the real economy, and all three of China’s “new three” industries have emerged from traditional industries. For example, although the three core systems of new energy vehicles—batteries, electric motors, and electronic controls—have replaced the conventional internal combustion engine powertrain, the manufacturing processes used to produce vehicles remain fundamentally continuous with those of traditional gasoline-powered cars. The solar photovoltaic industry originated in polysilicon, which belongs to the nonferrous metals industry. The subsequent production of silicon wafers, solar cells, and modules all relies on mature processes from the electronics industry. Lithium-ion batteries originated in traditional electrochemistry and materials manufacturing. These industries did not emerge out of thin air. They were built on the strong foundations of traditional industries and sustained technological innovation. Third, we must proactively understand and respond to the impact of new technological developments on employment. Looking at manufacturing, during the 14th Five-Year Plan period, employment rose in some industries and fell in others, but overall manufacturing employment remained stable at around 110 million people. Throughout human history, new technologies have continuously affected employment. The replacement of physical labor by machinery and equipment, and of certain forms of cognitive labor by information technology, has been an ongoing process. We can see this in our daily lives. Some jobs are disappearing, while new …

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Paulo Morceiro@PMorceiro·Oct 30

A indústria deveria ser uma prioridade central do Lula 4 para fazer o país crescer de modo continuado, desenvolver tecnologia, exportar valor agregado, vital para a soberania nacional e bons empregos. Chega de desindustrialização!

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Mateo Hoyos@mathoyos·Oct 29

GDP per capita remains a very informative measure of wellbeing. And that the reason I think developing economies should be utterly obsessed about economic growth.

What is life like at different levels of GDP per capita? In this new chart I visualised it for 12 different dimensions.

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Wendy Leutert@wendyleutert·Oct 23

The @OECD's new 2026 Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises report, released today, finds that SOEs' economic footprint has doubled over the past decade, based on data from 58 OECD member & partner economies tinyurl.com/rsz2kr7 @OECDgov

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Maurício Santoro@msantoro1978·Oct 20

A Folha publicou em português a excelente reportagem do Financial Times sobre a expansão do trabalho precário como motorista de Uber no Brasil (país que mais usa o aplicativo), e como isso ajuda a entender o mal-estar na economia e a eleição presidencial. folha.uol.com.br/mercado/202…

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Ben Norton@BenjaminNorton·Oct 17

The problem with this argument is it rests entirely on the widely misunderstood concept of labor productivity. Many people, especially non-economists, hear calls to "increase the average labor productivity of Brazilian workers" and think that means the reason Brazil is so much poorer than Switzerland is because Brazilian workers are supposedly lazy and don't work as hard as Swiss workers. But that is false and absurd. Labor productivity is simply defined as worker contribution to real GDP per hour of labor. The reason labor productivity is low in Brazil, and in the periphery in general, is because of the productive structure of the economy. Brazil, like most of Latin America (and the periphery as a whole), has an economy centered on exports of agricultural goods, minerals, energy, and other commodities. These are very low value-added, labor-intensive sectors with lots of international competition (and therefore low profit margins). The reason Switzerland's labor productivity is so high is because it has monopolistic "moats" in some very high value-added sectors like specialized financial services (ie, banking for global oligarchs) and advanced manufacturing. A Swiss banker working on a computer in an air-conditioned office will have an exponentially higher labor productivity than a Brazilian farmer or miner (or even a Brazilian banker), not because the Swiss banker works harder (they objectively don't), but because they work in specialized high value-added services and can simply charge exponentially more for their labor. These high value-added industries can't just be magically recreated in the periphery. Every country in Latin America and Africa would love to be the next Singapore (and many have tried), but you can't skip stages of development. Not everyone in the world can just work in the high value-added service sector -- especially when the high labor productivity in the advanced economies fundamentally depends on cheap energy, food, and minerals produced by workers in the periphery. When we talk about the global value chain, we're really talking about a highly stratified global division of labor. And it is very, very difficult to move up it. That takes years of careful planning, investment, education, training, infrastructure build-out, technology transfer, etc. -- which in turn requires political stability and the ability of the state to implement long-term planning without significant disruption. Neoliberalism was never as simple as "the government must spend less". It was about the state giving power to markets and the investor class to decide what the priorities of political-economy policymaking would be. This investor class (consisting of both foreign investors and the domestic compradores) prioritizes maximizing return on investment, not developing the productive capacity of the local economy. That's why it primarily invests in the extractive commodity export sector. This also explains why Brazil (and most of Latin America) significantly deindustrialized during the neoliberal period, and has become even more dependent on the low value-added export of commodities.

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In Brazil the situation is even more extreme: 1. There are 39 million formal private sector employees. 2. There are 20 million families on government welfare, with nearly 60 million people, plus 37 million people that are retired and receiving government pensions (however, in Brazil many "retired" people continue working in the informal sector). Brazil is a country of 210 million where 39 million formal workers produce 85-90% of GDP. The inequality in productivity is even more pronounced if you consider that the 270 major public companies in the Brazilian stock market produce 18% of Brazil's GDP while employing 2.8 million workers (portal.fgv.br/noticias/estud…). That means that 1.3% of the total population and 2.7% of the labor force produce 17.9% of output in the nation. This shows the enormous but so far unexploided growth potential in Brazil: if we increased the average labor productivity of Brazilian workers to the standard of the 270 major public companies, GDP would be 6.6 times the current figure, higher in per capita terms than in the US or Switzerland.