
THE FALL OF JENSEN HUANG AND THE NEW US POLITICAL CAPITALISM This week I had the pleasure of discussing Iceland, banks and power with Catherine E. Batt, PhD, Associate Professor at Copenhagen Business School. POLITICAL CAPITALISM IN ICELAND Her new article “Banking on Power” in Enterprise & Society traces Iceland’s banking system from 1885 to 2025 - state-led development, party-based finance, liberalisation, collapse and reprivatisation. It is a fascinating read and highly relevant to what is happening in the US right now. Catherine’s key concept is “political capitalism” - a system in which political and business elites cooperate so that regulation, appointments, credit and state power reinforce each other. She prefers the term to “crony capitalism”, which implies that an otherwise impersonal market order has been corrupted. In political capitalism, elite coordination is part of the order itself. Her central finding is that liberalisation and privatisation did not depoliticise Icelandic banking. Political influence simply moved into ownership, board appointments and personal credit relationships. When Landsbanki and Búnaðarbanki were privatised in 2002-03, one went to a group linked to the Independence Party, the other to a consortium tied to the Progressive Party - the two governing parties splitting the spoils. Within a few years the banks’ assets grew from 100% to more than 900% of GDP. Then they collapsed. As she puts it, political capitalism “is a product of reform rather than an obstacle to it”. THE US’S NEW POLITICAL CAPITALISM Iceland has started to move away from political capitalism. Catherine shows that in the 2020s, under sustained external scrutiny, the system met its first real constraint. The US, meanwhile, has moved rapidly in the opposite direction under Trump. Some would call it crony capitalism. I actually find political capitalism the more telling term, because it explains the phenomenon rather than just labelling it. Crony capitalism suggests a few bad apples in an otherwise sound market economy. Political capitalism describes a system in which political connections are how business gets done. At its most extreme, it becomes clan economics - as we know it from a number of African countries, from Turkey and from Russia, where the ruler’s family and inner circle hold stakes across the economy, and where a company’s fortunes rise and fall with its standing in the clan. NVIDIA IS NOT AN ORDINARY COMPANY Nvidia’s share price has plunged since late October. That is neither about Huang’s affairs nor about the Democrats’ midterm victory. Nor is the stock falling because the market has lost a fantastic CEO (as for example @jasonfurman has suggested) - at least not in the traditional sense. That would be strange. What the market is pricing is the loss of his relationship with US President Donald Trump and US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick. Huang was the guarantee. And that is far more worrying than any affair, because it shows how much of the US AI boom hangs on what I would call the US’s “New Political Capitalism”. This is also very similar to the kind of concerns Paul Krugman raised about the so-called 'Asian Tigers' in the 1990s. And as then the US' present boom is led by what certainly looks like excessive capital accumulation. Nvidia cannot be analysed as an ordinary company in a market economy with strong institutions and the rule of law. It should rather be seen the way we would see Baykar in Turkey or Yukos in Russia - companies whose earnings depend on the regime. HOW THE GUARANTEE WAS BUILT The timeline in the chart below shows how the guarantee was built - and how personal, family, business and political interests became entangled. April 2025 - three months after Trump took office, his administration requires an export licence for Nvidia’s H20 chip to China. May 2025 - the administration scraps Joe Biden’s rule restricting exports of AI chips. August 2025 - Nvidia may sell the H20 to China in return for handing 15% of the revenue to the US government. October 2025 - Nvidia joins the donors to Trump’s White House ballroom. According to the Washington Post, it gave $25m - the top amount. December 2025 - Trump allows sales of the more powerful H200 chip to China for 25%. Nvidia pays $ 20bn for Groq. Three months earlier, Donald Trump Jr’s fund 1789 Capital had invested in Groq. January and February 2026 - according to his filings with the US Office of Government Ethics, Trump buys Nvidia shares worth $ 1.5-6m. March 2026 - Cantor Fitzgerald, controlled by Lutnick’s sons, holds Nvidia shares worth almost $600m. Lutnick’s department runs US export controls. May 2026 - Huang and Eric Trump join Trump on his trip to Beijing. August 2026 - Huang summons his top finance executives. Nvidia is in talks to guarantee billions of dollars for customers who cannot afford its chips. 29 October 2026 - the New York Times reports Huang’s ties to a woman US intelligence believes is a Chinese spy - a former executive at Megaspeed, the Nvidia customer that several US agencies wanted blacklisted. 3 November 2026 - the midterms weaken Trump. 12 November 2026 - Huang steps down. The board makes Kress interim CEO. 13 November 2026 - US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent publicly attacks Lutnick for not blacklisting Megaspeed. THE AUGUST MEETING That August meeting deserves more attention than the affairs. According to the Wall Street Journal, Huang called in Colette Kress and his senior finance team to diagnose a ballooning problem. Nvidia was in talks to provide billions of dollars of guarantees to companies that could not afford its chips. Several of those deals were led by Huang’s son-in-law, Nico Caprez, who had been offering financing to upstart cloud providers and data-centre developers in the hope of turning them into long-term customers. Huang had launched a dealmaking spree and was starting to wonder whether it had gone too far. The big cloud providers were moving away from Nvidia and planning to use other chips. And the wafers and memory Nvidia had committed to buy were coming at him like an “avalanche”, as he put it. Instead of listening to his CFO, he tore into her. He interrupted her presentation, called her “a deer in the headlights” and described her as a “reporting CFO” - not someone who could help him set strategy or make decisions. So the risk-taking was built in at the top. Huang took big bets and did not tolerate being contradicted. The board let him. His son-in-law ran the riskiest deals. And Kress, the executive he belittled, has now been named interim CEO and has to steer Nvidia through the avalanche he described. A GUARANTEE ON TOP OF A GUARANTEE Notice what that means. Nvidia was guaranteeing its customers. And Nvidia itself was guaranteed by its political protection. When the political guarantee goes, the financial guarantees become less credible - exactly when the customers need them most. PERSONAL, FAMILY, BUSINESS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS Look at the pattern. The president’s family invests in a company that Nvidia then buys. Nvidia funds the president’s ballroom. The president buys Nvidia shares after his own administration opens China to its chips. The commerce secretary’s sons hold Nvidia shares while his department decides on Nvidia’s exports. Huang’s son-in-law runs the riskiest deals while Huang silences the CFO who should check them. And Huang’s private life ends up entangled with a customer under export-control scrutiny. That is political capitalism - not as corruption of an otherwise impersonal market order, but as the order itself. It is starting to look like clan economics. I doubt this story is over. But we should not focus on Jensen Huang’s private life. We should focus on how much of the US AI boom rests on personal, family, business and political interests that are impossible to separate.





















