
One wonders why this story is out now, shortly after the Trump admin’s latest round of pressure against Ukraine./5 END

@YorktownInst, @LSEIRDept. Author of Arsenal of Democracy (Hoover Press, November 2025), Breaking the New Axis (Naval Institute Press, April 2026)

One wonders why this story is out now, shortly after the Trump admin’s latest round of pressure against Ukraine./5 END

The remarkable parallel with Kushner and Witkoff today is that the Russians again can use multiple channels to avoid getting pinned down. Americans would be far more effective if they did the same./4

Yet we’re just asked to believe that “borders and NATO” are serious and clear conditions from Putin, while UA is “fantastical” for “refusing” to talk. All while RU explicitly uses multiple channels, moves goalposts, and maintains intransigence?/3

Two American businessmen, one of whom has connections to the Trump admin, reach out to RU via a Stasi officer who has been close to VVP for 30 years. They’re used to establish a backchannel and told RU is “very serious” about peace./2

This story is fascinating, mainly because of what it tells us about Russian negotiations. It’s a remarkable prelude to Kushner and Witkoff. The real question is why release this story now?/1
At one of the tensest points in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, two Americans teamed up with a former GDR spy to stop nuclear war. They just needed to tell Putin. On the cover of @FTMag this week, one of the most extraordinary stories I've ever reported: ft.com/content/dcb57f30-bbfe…

An alternative explanation is that the Saudis don’t want to do this themselves for fear of Iranian retaliation. And why would they, after six months of no peace no war, mixed messaging from the US, and a burnt bridge with the UAE?
Something very strange is going on with the Saudi Air Force. They have 250 modern aircraft, including Typhoons and F-15Es, but they’re incapable of launching airstrikes on their own border? This bears watching closely.

Cultural concepts matter a lot. But the case particulars matter too. Civvies have to want to impose an unequal dialogue and have the structures to do so. The latter is hard to identify in UA. Military empirics reinforce this. /8 END

Bankova should be able to solve personnel conflicts. But real divided responsibilities are more apparent there. Bankova runs a secondary government parallel to the ministries, a defect of UA political structures that has existed for multiple admins. /7

That is hard anywhere and here in ZSU are more problems. Service commanders struggle with regional commanders, splitting C2 (Corps) and sustainment (OSG) functions is confusing, all leads to friction. This is inevitable in wartime to a point, but should be fixed. /6

But it’s not clear that the alternative US system of PRES-DEFMIN-Field Commander is viable in UA. Very difficult to have a civvie in C2 system in an integrated theater war. The best way to solve this is personnel management! /5

The result however is DefMin faces TWO leads, admittedly in hierarchy (CINC —> CGS) who have overlapping responsibility, esp for force management (mobilization, logistics, supply and purchasing). The unequal dialogue is always hard, it’s harder with two soldiers than one! /4

ZSU specifically dealt with a unique combat problem pre-22. Fighting an active positional war and planning for a larger war. That paradox is partly why UA splits CGS and CINC. Moreover, UA is an integrated battlespace. There must be one C2 at the top to control ops. /3

There’s a good case for this model’s logic more generally applied. The CGS is not necessarily suited to be a wartime commander. And military advice (eg CJCS) is distinct from planning and command. A dedicated C2 function is also always necessary! /2

This argument contains a lot of truth but misses WHY Ukraine’s specific system exists. ZSU divides between Force Management (CGS) and C2 (CINC) in a manner not seen in the post Soviet space. That choice matters as much as civmil culture. /1
Fedorov's dismissal and his feud with Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi is not a unique incident. It's the latest result of Ukraine's disbalanced civil-military relations that persisted for years before the full-scale invasion. A recent academic paper by Renz & Whitmore proves this 1/12

Highly recommend this @WarIntellectual for @RiddleRussia on the evolution of war in Ukraine and how both parties are adapting to it ridl.io/can-the-russia-ukrai…

All wars must end. But they can escalate before they end. RU still has opportunities to push Europe, which is weakest link in UA-Europe-US chain, especially with its objectives still expansive and talks largely incoherent./25