Employee #1 and Director of Software Engineering (AU) @bugcrowd. Ruby, infosec, pol. He/him Social media is bad for you Cryptocurrencies are bad for the planet.
I guess I have to say why...
"I had AI spit this out in a few seconds. I didn't spend any time checking it myself, but I won't disclose that to you. Instead, I'm presenting it to you as if it's my work."
It's simultaneously dishonest and deeply disrespectful of other people.
Dario Amodei on open source models:
“If the path continues, I think we could get to a very dangerous place.”
“When you control a model and you're deploying it, you have the ability to monitor its usage.”
“You can revoke a user's access. You can change what the model is willing to do.”
“When a model is released in an uncontrolled manner, there's no ability to do that. It's entirely out of your hands.”
“We should confront the advocates of this with that problem and challenge them to solve it.”
He clearly doesn't believe Intelligence should be in the hand of the masses and Sam Altman also saying "RAM" shouldn't be accessible to everyone indefinitely agreed with him.
"Youth today do not work as hard as youth even 20yrs ago"
I posit that the amount of time the average Australian worker spent at the pub on company time 20, 30 and 40 years ago was significantly higher, and the expectations of their productivity per hour significantly lower.
If you're submitting a bug report, it should be unbelievably easy to read and reproduce for the triager.
You should not assume that the triager has any context of what the application is or what it does in the context of the business, or even what the business does. You should not assume that they will read a wall of text.
When you're preparing the report, just imagine that you're writing for a triager that is exhausted from already reading 95 submissions that day before they came across yours, almost all of the previous ones were AI generated reports describing intended features and framing them as vulnerabilities. That's what you're dealing with.
Open the report with a clear impact statement. "By exploiting this vulnerability, an attacker is able to XYZ". This provides useful context to the triager up front so that they can read the rest of the vulnerability write-up through that lens. Make sure whatever this sentence says has clear security impact, according to the CIA triad. In other words, the bug must either:
- Leak confidential information to the attacker
- Affect the integrity of the system's data
- Affect the availability of the application
If it doesn't *clearly* hit this standard, then it should not be submitted.
Then, your job is to demonstrate the attack taking place, with evidence. It's not enough to say "an attacker could do this" you have to actually do it and take screenshots. You can not submit hypothetical vulnerabilities and rely on the security team or triager to investigate, they just won't do it. I should note that there is a fine line you're walking here. You need to demonstrate the vulnerability without going too far. For example, you might leak PII of one user - but downloading 1000 of them is going too far. Grabbing the DB version or table names from a SQLi to demonstrate impact is fine, dumping PII is not.
Omarchy folks. Less slop, more code reviews, please.
v3 -> v4 migration just deleted my network setup without warning. SSH gone, tailscale gone. And migration never finished bc of a browser bug.
That's not called a migration
I find it hard to believe that people who make coffee believe they are owed a salary that allows them to raise a family, buy a house, cars and exotic vacations.
They make coffee!
"If I can inject a null-terminated string *here*, I can cause a segfault and get RCE"
Yes yes, and if I could teleport into the bank vault I could steal all their sweet cash
I’m looking for a full time gig as a Staff/Lead Product Engineer.
Recent experience: built systems that handle billions of dollars of credit card payments, and all the serious security stuff that comes with that.
Get in touch.
Ryanbigg.com/real-resume
I love that people want to assume that I formed my opinions on the viability of current generation open-weight LLMs for enabling low-skilled criminals to find useful zero-day exploits, based on having just never used an LLM at all.
The first thing I did when Anthropic added me to their CVP was build an autonomous zero-day exploitation pipeline. I've since backported it to use open-weight models because the token cost was insane, so I have a fairly good feel for both current frontier and open-weight model capabilities.
I'm well aware of what LLMs are capable of doing, and that they can, with the right steering or harness find zero-day exploits. Where we drift off course is with the claim that low-skilled criminals can just pick up something like GLM and find viable zero-day exploits.
I think that:
a) More than 90% of CVEs are functionally useless for threat actors. Threat actors have a very specific operational needs and "random issue in random software" does not fall into their scope.
b) Many (quite possibly even the majority of) critical rated CVEs are not exploitable under real-world conditions in a way that is useful to threat actors. There's entire teams in China dedicated to n-day exploitation and watching them will give you a good feel for what percent of critical RCEs are actually useful.
c) Threat actor with no exploit development background and minimal technical skills, even with access to a completely unrestricted open-weight LLMs, would struggle or completely fail to find useful zero-day exploits.
d) People with very little experience in software exploitation, Large Language Models, and CTI, are watching professional vulnerability researchers working with next-gen frontier models and ending up with a wildly unrealistic beliefs of just how "easy" what they are doing is.
e) There is an extremely noticeable lack of both zero-day exploitation and use of novel (non-public) n-day exploits by all threat actors, especially unskilled ones, and proponents of the "anyone can just pick up GLM and find useful zero-day exploits" theory continually refuse to even acknowledge that fact, let alone attempt to explain it.
I'm not coming at this from the position of some dude who just logs on to social media to says uninformed shit. I'm coming at this from the perspective of a researcher who has spent thousands of hours since LLMs came out researching their capabilities, and has also spent their entire career tracking threat actors and their capabilities.
I have a mountain of real-world data, because the low-skilled AI-powered threat actors have a high tendency to accidentally infect themselves with their own malware. This often results in them exfiltrate their entire hard disk, along with all their AI prompt logs, to a vibe-coded C2 with client-side authentication (the admin credentials are hardcoded into the javascript or something equally stupid, so anyone can log in and download it).
My entire career I've been very pro "degrees and certs don't matter, everyone is welcome, and the best way to gain experience is hands-on practical work". But when I have some dude whose only experience is essentially just "downloaded abliterated GLM and scared himself with it", I feel like it's necessary to draw a line somewhere.
It's not just the bad opinions, everyone has bad opinions on something, I have plenty. It's that resources are actively being diverted away from addressing real and pressing issues in cybersecurity, as a result of FUD being spread about imaginary GLM-powered zero-day wielding scriptkiddies.
I can't believe this needs to be said but like, don't use other people's IDs to verify yourself on services like bug bounty platforms that do financial things. It's fraud, it will come out in the wash, OFAC and KYC make it a big problem, you will forfeit all your earnings etc.