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Lynne Kiesling-Knowledge Problem11,765 posts
Lynne Kiesling-Knowledge Problem avatar

Lynne Kiesling-Knowledge Problem

@knowledgeprob

Director, Inst for Regulatory Law & Economics @NorthwesternU, Adjunct Prof @NU_MSES, @sfiscience External Faculty, @AEI Nonres Senior Fellow

◷ Joined April 2009▧ 298 Photos and videos
Michael E. Webber avatar
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Michael E. Webber@MichaelEWebber·Nov 6

Counterpoint: ERCOT’s market design is the most competitive and efficient in the world and the result is that we can bring in new power more cleanly and cheaply than anywhere outside China (whose subsidies, labor rules and environmental standards are fundamentally different).

Advice for Blue Texas: don't listen to the champions of ERCOT wholesale markets in your energy policy. Outside of the public power territories, the status quo of rah rah energy abundance via renewables is not yielding cheaper prices for Texas households like it is for Texas biz. publicpowerreview.org/p/whol…

ArnoHarris avatar
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ArnoHarris@ArnoHarris·Nov 6

Developer here, I'd argue this trend is less about generous AI labs bestowing benefits on communities -- rather labs are "skating to where the puck will be" in the negotiation for community acceptance. Lynne Kiesling piece captures it nicely:

Community Benefits Agreements are Coasean bargaining agreements. They create ways for data centers & host communities to negotiate over externalities like noise, water, pollution, and energy use, by defining rights, lowering transaction costs, and making commitments enforceable.

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Superalignment Inc avatar
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Superalignment Inc@sai__inc·Nov 2

What would make a world of many AIs safe? Read our full conversation with Ramez Naam on competition, open models, distributed defense, and the evidence that would change his mind: superalignment.inc/aligned/w…

Scott Beaulier avatar
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Scott Beaulier@ScottABeaulier·Oct 30

One of the most uncomfortable insights from @tylercowen's interview with @chronicle: AI is exposing how much of what we teach, test, and reward is becoming obsolete. The big threat to universities isn't going to be AI; it'll be our stubborn insistence on doing things the way we've always done them. Tyler Cowen’s Radical AI University chronicle.com/article/tyler-…

Alex Imas avatar
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Alex Imas@alexolegimas·Oct 29

I joined @GoogleDeepMind to develop a research program on the economics of AGI. Today, together with Andrew Koh (@andrewjkoh) and Shane Legg (@ShaneLegg), we are incredibly excited to release The Economics of Intelligence, the first in a series of projects from our group on how AGI will change the economy. How do capability improvements transform the economy, and when? In this project, we define thresholds of economic capabilities, e.g., minimal AGI, based on how they transform the economy. We then track how the economy–market structure, employment, and wages–changes during the transition across capability regimes. We have seen exponential increases in what AI agents can do but the broader economy seems almost remarkably unchanged. Part of the reason is that the solo AI agent is the wrong economic object; economic transformation is an equilibrium outcome where organizations compete. Looking at how intelligence functions within organizations, transformation will depend on when two key capability thresholds are crossed: competence (gains on individual skills, e.g., coding, math) and coordination (gains on ability of agents to cooperate and work together). We show that what economic transformation looks like depends on whether AI becomes supercompetent, supercooperative, or both—the regime of artificial superintelligence (ASI). Tracking this transition shows why the real visible transformation may come from improvements in coordination—a capability most benchmarks don’t yet track. Past a certain threshold, AI capabilities can break the Coasian ceiling on firm size and lead to an economy that looks drastically different than the one we see today. Two main takeaways: 1. To understand the path of transformation, we should be tracking agentic coordination more closely. 2. The impact of AI will likely show up in wages before market structure or employment. We are really excited about this paper. Excited to hear people’s thoughts. Link: institute.deepmind.com/essay…

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Duncan S. Campbell avatar
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Duncan S. Campbell@duncancampbell·Oct 27

IMO most BTM gas data centers will eventually connect to the grid. But their gas generation won’t be stranded. In fact, it will make their grid connection possible. By having their own capacity already, utilities can offer energy-only interconnections.

John Arnold avatar
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John Arnold@johnarnold·Oct 24

French protestors want higher public spending, wages, subsidies and pensions. Meanwhile France has gov’t spending of 57% of GDP (among highest of Western countries), deficits of 5% of GDP, 10 year bond rate >5%, and a currency they don’t control. I don’t understand how this ends.

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde avatar
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Jesús Fernández-Villaverde@JesusFerna7026·Oct 20

Everyone talks about what AI will do. But almost nobody asks who will pay for the machines. Taking advantage of AI will require an extraordinary amount of capital, from data centers to new power plants. Will that capital be around? I try to address that question in the first draft of my new paper “Saving for the Machines.” To show how important capital is to fuel the transition to an AI-based economy, I document how the same technology path that generates 11.7% annual growth when households choose their saving rate optimally delivers only 2.2% when the saving rate remains fixed. In other words, if we experience slow growth over the next few years despite fast improvements in AI, this slow growth may reflect too little capital accumulation instead of a technological bottleneck. The key to this result is that AI raises the capital share by moving tasks from labor to machines, which requires that those machines are built. In comparison, ordinary technical progress makes labor and existing machines better at the tasks they already perform. To inspect the mechanism, I start from an accounting identity: the saving rate is the capital share times the ratio of investment to capital income. If I take the evolution of the capital share as given, I can ask how much the latter ratio moves in response to that evolution. Crucially, with an optimizing household, this ratio barely moves. As machines take over tasks and the return to capital rises, the household responds by letting consumption grow faster, by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution times the rise in the return. To pay for that faster consumption, capital must also grow faster by the same amount. So, the household keeps investing about the same fraction of what the machines earn. And since machines earn a larger share of output, the saving rate also goes up. With a fixed saving rate, the same accounting identity tells me the opposite: the ratio falls in proportion as the capital share rises. Will the U.S. and other advanced economies then generate enough capital? For many reasons, I doubt it. We might end up in a situation where many of the opportunities offered by AI are left on the table. This is particularly important for all who think that AI might get us out of many problems, such as fiscal troubles (like in France) or ultra-low fertility. We need to save for the machines, and it is not clear we can do that. Anyway, this paper has been long in the making (many months of hard work), but I have learned much from it. In particular, working through the model changed my mind about many issues related to AI. Again and again, my intuition said X, but the math said Y. And math always won in the end. That is why we write formal models. A nice example is Proposition 5, whose proof is the one I like the most in the paper. With improving machines and strong task complementarity, there is no fixed balanced growth path because the target itself keeps moving. The nice part of the proof is to realize that, after the right normalization, the moving target becomes a fixed point, and the saddle gets steeper as machines improve. So instead of falling behind, the economy tracks the moving BGP more and more closely. A fair amount of ODE work to get there, but a very simple economic idea underneath it once you get it. The paper is here: sas.upenn.edu/~jesusfv/Savin… and the slides are here: sas.upenn.edu/~jesusfv/Slide…

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Abundance Institute avatar
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Abundance Institute@abundanceinst·Oct 19

One startup is trapping mosquitoes by mimicking human biological signals and using AI to surveil them—all without chemicals. And it works both outside and inside. Mosquito-borne diseases are serious public health concerns, and AI is powering new technology to reduce the harms they cause. @TechCrunch @kateparknews

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Kevin A. Bryan avatar
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Kevin A. Bryan@Afinetheorem·Oct 14

Great conference at @rootsinprogress this weekend, as has been true in '24 and '25. What works here: 1) Everyone is on board with "high-agency, high-progress, high-optimism", but conditional on that, huge differences in field of work, political preferences, country of origin. 1/4