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Joe @ Sicher Height572 posts
Joe @ Sicher Height avatar

Joe @ Sicher Height

@sicher_height

phishing attack survivor working on 🕵️: blockchain forensic investigations / analytics / compliance

◷ Joined June 2012▧ 14 Photos and videos
Charles Guillemet avatar
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Charles Guillemet@P3b7_·Jun 5

👉For 4 years, 1 day, and 10 hours, anyone who understood the Orchard circuit could have minted ZEC out of thin air, silently, with no on-chain signature. The bug was disclosed this week. It was found by an AI-driven audit running Opus 4.8, not by an attacker. 1. Call the bug what it is Two lines in halo2's variable-base scalar multiplication gadget used assign_advice() where copy_advice() was required. As a result, the diversified-address integrity check pk_d = [ivk]·g_d could be satisfied for arbitrary inputs. A malicious prover could spend the same note multiple times with different nullifiers, i.e. counterfeit ZEC inside the Orchard pool, undetectable on-chain because the privacy of the ZK proof hides exactly the inputs that would reveal the attack. We do not know whether it was exploited. We will probably never know. 2. Four years. Multiple audits. Top-tier reviewers. Orchard was reviewed by some of the strongest cryptographers in the field before activation. They missed it. Earlier automated audits with Opus 4.7 missed it. Opus 4.8 catches it in roughly 1 in 4 runs when prompted generically. The bug is hard. And ZK inflation bugs are not new. Zcash itself shipped a counterfeiting vulnerability in Sprout (BCTV14) that survived years before being silently neutralized during Sapling. Similar soundness issues have appeared in circom, halo2, and rollup verifiers since. The pattern is consistent: when the protocol is private, exploitation is undetectable. You patch the bug and hope. 3. What Zcash did right This was a textbook decentralized incident response: ▶️Audit: a full AI-assisted soundness audit of halo2 + Orchard, scoped end-to-end. ▶️Discover: the agent flagged the missing constraint and worked out the algebra to turn it into an exploit. A working RPC-level PoC in ~6 hours, mostly waiting on tokens. ▶️Coordinate: a soft fork disabling Orchard, prepared and distributed without leaking the bug, activated 2 days and 15 hours after acknowledgement. Coordinating a soft fork across miners, exchanges, and nodes without disclosing why is genuinely hard. They did it. ▶️Disclose: timeline, code lines, math, open questions. No spin. Worth naming explicitly: Zcash's turnstile invariant caps the value that can ever leave a shielded pool by the value that entered it. Privacy and verifiability inside the same protocol. That is not an accident. That is good engineering, and it is what kept the worst case bounded. 4. The economics of security just changed AI does not change whether bugs like this exist. It changes the cost of finding them. I wrote about this x.com/P3b7_/status/203643721…: a missing constraint in a 4-year-old production ZK circuit used to require a top-tier cryptographer with months of context. It now requires a few tokens, an API key, and a well-framed prompt. The defender benefits. The attacker benefits more, they only need to find it once, and they never disclose. Orchard is the optimistic version of this story: defense got there first. The pessimistic version is the one we cannot rule out, because the chain is private by design. 5. The only real exit You do not patch your way out of this asymmetry. You raise the floor. Formal verification of consensus-critical circuits, every assign_advice audited by SAT solvers and AI for under-constraint, as the reporter himself recommends. Proof-grade engineering that used to be too expensive is now cheap enough to be mandatory. Hardware roots of trust, secure enclaves, certified secure elements, WYSIWYS. Cryptographic guarantees the user can actually verify, not promises a host can lie about. Continuous AI-assisted audit of every consensus-critical commit, re-run immediately on the release of any new frontier model. Zcash didn't just patch a bug. They demonstrated the new defensive playbook: AI-driven audits, decentralized coordination, radical transparency, verifiable invariants. That is the direction the rest of the industry needs to follow. And those who don't raise the bar for security will be rekt in this new world. Stay safe. Stay honest about your trust assumptions.

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zooko🛡🦓🦓🦓 ⓩ @zooko Jun 4 Article The Orchard Counterfeiting Vulnerability — and next steps By Zooko Wilcox, Jason McGee, and Taylor Hornby Update! This article is about the problem. See https://x.com/zooko/status/2063262293442678830 about the solution. Summary On May 29, 2026, Taylor Hornby discovered a critical

pray.gwei avatar
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pray.gwei@pray_eth·Jun 2

Thoughts on the @gnosispay hack: 1 - @gnosis_ team is honorable, they keep their word, users should not panic. However, after 5 years, so much in DeFi still relies on the integrity of the core team, which is unfortunate. 2 - Communication was excellent by crypto standards, but not great for a non-crypto audience. I followed updates on Twitter and Telegram, I understood what was likely happening behind the scenes. Non-crypto people will need emergency numbers to call, proactive email updates, website updates, etc. They would not know, for example, that their other accounts (non crypto) are not impacted, or understand the timing involved in white hat rescue. They would not know to follow @koeppelmann on Twitter for updates, etc. It more or less works now because Gnosis Pay has <1000 active users. Of course, these same "emergency" situations are ripe for exploitation by hackers! I can see future emails or calls from scammers urging people to send their money to a new address. So it's a delicate balance, and there should be safe channels for communication. 3 - There is no way DeFi stablecoin yield compensates users for this level of risk. Some (like me) do it to help move this space forward, but we should have no illusions any sane person will do this without legal guarantees and crypto-specific customer care infrastructure when issues arise. The current process in crypto is pray the core team will do the right thing... That's not going to scale to a wider audience. 4 - I love Gnosis Pay and will continue to use it, just waiting for word I can recharge my card. A huge thanks to everyone working like crazy behind the scenes. 🙏

Joe @ Sicher Height avatar
Joe @ Sicher Height@sicher_height·Jun 2

→ Pre-load them with CoW Protocol order data → Wait for the Delay Module cooldown → Execute against hundreds of Gnosis Pay Safes The deployed contracts appear to be fake EIP-1271 signature validators. From what I can see.

Joe @ Sicher Height avatar
Joe @ Sicher Height@sicher_height·Jun 2

Quick on-chain look at the Gnosis Pay exploit Attacker address 0x81BA8A2b895D30280bca199C2Ff75f3F058d4C6c The setup pattern looks something like: → Deploy a small number of malicious contracts → Configure them via the Roles module as trusted signers...cont.

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koeppelmann avatar
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koeppelmann@koeppelmann·Jun 1

Unfortunately, there is a hack related to @gnosispay and the "delay module". Please be patient while we try to contain the damage. Rest assured, Gnosis will cover all user losses.

Odysseus | phylax.systems avatar
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Odysseus | phylax.systems@odysseas_eth·May 19

if you use private repositories to host infra topology or secrets in plaintext, please consider rotating your secrets

GitHub@githubMay 19

We are investigating unauthorized access to GitHub’s internal repositories. While we currently have no evidence of impact to customer information stored outside of GitHub’s internal repositories (such as our customers’ enterprises, organizations, and repositories), we are closely monitoring our infrastructure for follow-on activity.

Joe @ Sicher Height avatar
Joe @ Sicher Height@sicher_height·May 13

Patrick and Cyfrin do an awesome job and have been a fantastic resource for me.

1 year ago, I made a video about how blind signing would cause massive pain. Since then, we've seen hack after hack (recently, Drift protocol for almost $300M), where clear signing could have helped mitigate. Today, we finally have a systemic upgrade to wallet UX 👇

9:42
Patrick Collins avatar
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Patrick Collins@PatrickAlphaC·May 13

1 year ago, I made a video about how blind signing would cause massive pain. Since then, we've seen hack after hack (recently, Drift protocol for almost $300M), where clear signing could have helped mitigate. Today, we finally have a systemic upgrade to wallet UX 👇

9:42
David Hoffman avatar
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David Hoffman@TrustlessState·Apr 24

I want to share a quick story from a friend, who recently had ~$450k almost phished from a wallet Thanks to @SEAL_911 - it was all completely recovered and returned. A happy ending that deserves highlighting! I knew SEAL 911 existed, but this was the first time I've saw them in action. Here's the story: A friend got phished from a fake Ledger Live app (on the Apple App Store 2 weeks?!). His ETH was staked on Figment, and the phisher executed the withdrawal transaction, and the ETH entered the withdrawal queue. He reached out to the Seal 911 group and within 15 min, he was on a discord call with the White Hat Recovery team. You could imagine how shitty my friend felt, assuming that the $450k of ETH was simply going to be withdrawn and immediately captured by the attacker. They made him feel at ease, shared case studies of similar rescues and said they charge 5% (totally agreeable amount imo) of whatever funds they recovered. The tension was all down to the single block that the ETH became available for withdrawal after the exit-queue finished. $450k riding on a 12 second window. My poor friend had to wait 4 days while this all hung in the balance lol. The day finally came. Seal 911 has set up a script with Flashbots to engage in the bidding war required to access the funds. At 11pm that night, he received the long-awaited message: “got it all, best possible outcome.” Within 10 min, the funds were distributed to his new ETH wallet and the job was done. Kudos to the Seal 911 team, really amazing group of professionals.

Joe @ Sicher Height avatar
Joe @ Sicher Height@sicher_height·Mar 10

Beware of fake messages from fake Signal accounts. Whether SMS or otherwise. Stay safe

We are aware of recent reports regarding targeted phishing attacks that have resulted in account takeovers of some Signal users, including government officials and journalists. We take this very seriously. To be clear: Signal’s encryption and infrastructure have not been compromised and remain robust. These attacks were executed via sophisticated phishing campaigns, designed to trick users into sharing information – SMS codes and/or Signal PIN – to gain access to users’ accounts. 1/4

Officer's Notes avatar
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Officer's Notes@officer_secret·Jan 19

They say that geniuses learn from other people's mistakes, ordinary people learn from their own mistakes, and fools don't learn at all. So... Want to learn how to recognize Web3 phishing absolutely free and safely? Use these two tests and you won't regret it.

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PeckShieldAlert@PeckShieldAlert·Jan 13

#peckshieldalert #rugpull Former NYC Mayor Eric Adams @ericadamsfornyc has reportedly executed a rugpull on his newly launched memecoin, $NYC. After the token was promoted on his personal social media, its liquidity was abruptly removed only 30 minutes post-launch, resulting in a $3M loss for investors.

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JP avatar
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JP@rugpullfinder·Jan 8

8,535 ETH $26M stolen from a hack on an unverified contract stealing @TruBit_Global tokens Attacker: 0x6C8EC8f14bE7C01672d31CFa5f2CEfeAB2562b50 Victim contract: 0x1De399967B206e446B4E9AeEb3Cb0A0991bF11b8

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