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Taz Wake110,982 posts
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Taz Wake

@tazwake

#DFIR #ThreatHunting | @SANSInstitute instructor | SANS Course Author | CISSP (etc) holder | tazwake.bsky.social | Rarely used account.

◷ Joined November 2009▧ 6,834 Photos and videos
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Taz Wake@tazwake·9 Jan 2025

Some good news today in that one of the few remaining holdouts making me keep access to Twitter has finally moved to a new platform. If you want hasty responses from me, you will be better off finding me elsewhere.

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⟳ Taz Wake retweeted
Marcus Hutchins@MalwareTechBlog·Nov 16

You wouldn't believe the number of networks I've seen saved by canary credentials, this stuff works and it works extremely well. The first thing most threat actors do when they successfully break into a network is look for useful credentials to pivot off of or escalate access with. Make sure they find some. fake API keys, usernames and passwords, session tokens, NTLM hashes, password.txt. Put them everywhere. Servers, employee endpoints, password managers, the web browser's password/session databases, cloud storage buckets, network shares. The credentials should look legitimate, high value, and be unique to each individual system or user. That way you can set up granular detection for what happens when an attacker attempts to log in with a canary credential. You can not only instantly lock out the system it was stolen from, but also any real credentials belonging to that system/users, which may have been exfiltrated in the process.

mRr3b00t avatar
⟳ Taz Wake retweeted
mRr3b00t@UK_Daniel_Card·Nov 7

tweeps, a learning moment for all!

is there a good resource that gives details on the causes of all the recent security incidents? I really want a single document I can give to an agent so we can check our security against all the mistakes that caused breakes in the last few weeks.

mRr3b00t avatar
⟳ Taz Wake retweeted
mRr3b00t@UK_Daniel_Card·Nov 7

tweeps come bring your insider threat stories (the good and bad ones!)! this chap seems to not have been able to stop anyone from doing anything bad! maybe they never did DLP, USB/Device controls, Endpoint Management, firewall configs, Group Policies, MDM, threat hunting.... wrote policy documents.... (etc.)

I was talking about *insider* attacks. Few orgs I’ve seen could withstand even one malicious insider, let alone a thousand. Look at Binance: one insider was enough to cause havoc.

Taz Wake avatar
Taz Wake@tazwake·Aug 24

Attackers now weaponise new vulnerabilities within days of disclosure. That changes patch management from an IT chore into a business decision, and it raises a harder question: how do you know nobody got in before you patched? halkynconsulting.co.uk/a/202…

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SANS Institute@SANSInstitute·Aug 21

Before trying to fill another role, see what the people already on the team can do. That is Christopher Bloor's advice.

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Taz Wake@tazwake·Aug 21

The systemd journal holds a great deal of investigative value, provided retention settings kept it. This guide covers journalctl for responders, offline analysis, and the configuration that determines whether the evidence survived. halkynconsulting.co.uk/a/202…

Brett Shavers 🙄 avatar
⟳ Taz Wake retweeted
Brett Shavers 🙄@brettshavers·Aug 20

I went through 400 #DFIR books spanning 46 years. I think DFIR has drifted away from investigating human behavior and acts and toward artifacts and computer events. That bothers me. Here’s what I found. 🧵

mRr3b00t avatar
⟳ Taz Wake retweeted
mRr3b00t@UK_Daniel_Card·Jul 23

I hate doing videos…. But seriously someone needs to speak about this who has, actually done this stuff for a living, with actual hands on plan, design, deploy, test, defend, depend experience…..

2:03

Read this carefully. An AI agent broke out of its testing environment, found a vulnerability humans had missed and used it to hack into another company… all by itself. What stopped it wasn’t a human but another AI agent, running defensive systems on the target's infrastructure. That 👆 is the security model of the next decade in one paragraph. Agent versus agent, at machine speed, with humans reading the report after it all happened. Sam Altman will brief Washington on this next week, but the UK needs to have the same conversation, a domestic frontier lab and sovereign compute at the scale this now demands. Right now, we are sitting downstream of decisions taken in San Francisco which are vetted in Washington. That’s why it’s so important that AI now has a voice at the Cabinet table. ft.com/content/9db74b25-45ad…

mRr3b00t avatar
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mRr3b00t@UK_Daniel_Card·Jun 6

Have you looked at the patterns of sextortion and extortion? have you then thought... this pattern seems familiar.... trying to shame someone by them not having #DNSSEC enabled? Don't worry if not, I have! I have seen this occurring for years and years..... so I thought I would write a blog about it: pwndefend.com/2026/06/06/usi…

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⟳ Taz Wake retweeted
SANS Institute@SANSInstitute·May 8

New episode with @tazwake. Are we over-relying on tools vs fundamentals? 🎧 Full conversation with Taz Wake on the Cyber Leaders Podcast: go.sans.org/cPmBGi

0:53
mRr3b00t avatar
⟳ Taz Wake retweeted
mRr3b00t@UK_Daniel_Card·15 Oct 2025

I have a thing about mapping incidents to very granular taxonomies.... like an itch in my brain... because disability of incidents is a really difficult/variable thing... and trying to map things to a very specific taxonomy I think is difficult but also I think maybe flawed....

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I question if MITRE att&ck is the right framework for this.... I've been talking about that with mates for a while..... I think that mapping every incident to ATT&CK isn't realistic, I think because of the granularity and the fact that in some/many incidents you can't see everything means: people won't want to complete 9000 pages of incident reporting forms people will make mistakes the data at the end will be flawed cyber.gov.au/about-us/view-a…

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